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Rules vs Discretion: Calibrating the Scales for 
Financial Remedies on Divorce 
 
Andrew Mohamdee 
 
Abstract: 
This thesis will critically analyse the extent of judicial discretion provided by the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, specifically for the purposes of the law relating to financial 
remedy orders. Through a theoretical perspective, this thesis will examine the 
relationship between rules and discretion, with the aim of determining how these 
opposing components of the law ought to be balanced. It will be argued that in order to 
ascertain the ‘ideal balance’ for financial remedies, it is first necessary to discern the 
overarching purpose of the law. Upon answering this fundamental question, naturally it 
will be queried what the appropriate balance between rules and discretion is for financial 
remedies, and whether the current legal framework aligns with this inference. Ultimately, 
this thesis will conclude that reform is necessary to adjust the extent of discretion and 
rules provided in the statute in an attempt to resolve the deficiencies of the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1973 applicable to the granting of financial remedy orders.  
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Introduction 
The symbol of the scales of justice portrays an essential function of the law: weighing and 
evaluating competing interests. The relative weight, or importance, of such interests may 
vary according to number of factors, including, inter alia: social or economic context, 
moral values, legal precedent, and the specific area of law. One such example is the 
conflict between rules and discretion in the law relating to financial remedy orders. Both 
offer qualities that could further the central objectives of the particular law in question, as 
well as having their own drawbacks which could impede the law’s development. Thus, 
inherent to the scales of justice, the fundamental question is: how should rules and 
discretion be balanced in financial remedies law? 
 
Overview of the Law Relating to Financial Remedy Orders 
When the parties to a marriage or civil partnership decide to end their relationship, they 
may apply for a divorce or a dissolution of their civil partnership.1 As part of matrimonial 
proceedings, one issue which frequently arises is how property and assets are divided 
between the parties. Where a case is heard by a judge, the court has the authority to make 
a financial remedy order to reallocate the total assets amongst the former spouses.2 
                                                          
1 For the sake of brevity, this thesis will henceforth use the terms marriage and divorce to encompass the 
law relating to both heterosexual and same-sex marriages, as well as civil partnerships (which might soon 
apply to both opposite- and same-sex couples: see R (on the application of Steinfeld and Keidan) v 
Secretary of State for International Development [2018] UKSC 32, [2018] 3 WLR 415). This is because 
of the predominantly overlapping provisions which apply to these various formalised relationships: 
Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013; Civil Partnership Act 2004, sch 5(5). It is also worth noting that 
the path to receiving a divorce is likely to change: see the Divorce, Dissolution and Separation HC Bill 
(2017-19) 404. 
2 This may be in the form of financial provision orders, property adjustment orders, orders for the sale of 
property, pension sharing orders, and/or pension compensation sharing orders: Matrimonial Causes Act 
1973, ss 23, 24, 24A, 24B, and 24E respectively. 
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Alternatively, a case may be settled through alternative dispute resolution (ADR), through 
the mediums of mediation or arbitration.3 In either scenario, the law relating to financial 
remedies involves the resolution of financial disputes arising from the breakdown of a 
marriage. This thesis will evaluate financial remedies law in England and Wales—
particularly the extent of rules and discretion therein. In other words, the law relating to 
financial remedy orders will be analysed in order to discern the nature of the present 
formulation of the legal framework, with the aim of reaching a normative judgement on 
how the law ought to be constructed in relation to the weighting of rules and discretion. 
This area of law is predominantly governed by the Matrimonial Causes Act (MCA) 1973.4 
In handling financial remedy cases, practitioners will refer to Section 25, which lists 
matters to which the court is to have regard in deciding how to exercise its powers under 
ss. 23, 24 , 24A, 24B and 24E. For example, under Section 25(1), the court should give 
first consideration to the welfare of any child of the family. Moreover, Section 25(2) 
provides a list of factors which are relevant to the division of assets, which includes, 
among other considerations: the parties’ current and future income, their financial needs, 
their standard of living, the age of each party, and the duration of the marriage.5 
Additionally, Section 25A creates a duty for the courts to consider whether the financial 
ties between the parties should be terminated (i.e. a clean break). It is important to note 
                                                          
3 In fact, in order to issue financial remedy proceedings, it is a requirement that the parties first attend a 
Mediation Information & Assessment Meeting (MIAM): Family Procedure Rules (FPR), Rule 3.6 and 
Practice Direction 3A [11] and [13]. 
4 Specifically Part II Financial Relief for Parties to Marriage and Children of Family. 
5 MCA (n 2) ss 25(2)(a)-(d). Additional factors within the Section 25 list: (e) any physical or mental 
disability of either of the parties to the marriage; (f) the contributions which each of the parties has made 
or is likely in the foreseeable future to make to the welfare of the family, including any contribution by 
looking after the home or caring for the family; (g) the conduct of each of the parties, if that conduct is 
such that it would in the opinion of the court be inequitable to disregard it; (h) in the case of proceedings 
for divorce or nullity of marriage, the value to each of the parties to the marriage of any benefit which, by 
reason of the dissolution or annulment of the marriage, that party will lose the chance of acquiring. 
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that the Section 25 factors merely provide guidance for the court when making an award. 
They are not prescriptive, nor has Parliament assigned a relative weight or degree of 
importance to any of these factors.6 Evidently, Parliament chose to leave the interpretation 
of the statute by the judiciary open and flexible. 
As a result, it has largely been the responsibility of the judiciary to develop principles 
over time to clarify and embellish upon the critical issues in need of resolution by the 
law.7 For example, the landmark House of Lords decision in White v White, through Lord 
Nicholls’ articulation of the yardstick of equality, acknowledges the significance of 
fairness and the need to ensure non-discrimination as between the breadwinner and 
homemaker when making an order for financial relief.8 Subsequently, the House of Lords 
judgment in Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane expanded on the yardstick of 
equality, calling it the sharing principle.  Moreover, the considerations of needs and 
compensation have also been classified as additional guiding principles in reaching a 
decision in a financial remedy case. However, these judicially developed principles are 
not intended to be binding or applied in a mechanical manner, but rather are designed to 
simply act as ‘guidelines’ or ‘relevant considerations.’9 Accordingly, when this is coupled 
with the flexible nature of the MCA, the law is clearly suitable to the adjudication of each 
                                                          
6 Other than that the first consideration must be given to the welfare of any children to the parties: MCA 
(n 2) s 25(1). 
7 Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24, [2006] 2 AC 618 [7] (Lord Nicholls): ‘This 
is not to usurp the legislative function. Rather, it is to perform a necessary judicial function in the absence 
of parliamentary guidance.’ 
8 White v White [2000] UKHL 54, [2001] 1 AC 596 [25]: ‘Before reaching a firm conclusion and making 
an order along these lines, a judge would always be well advised to check his tentative views against the 
yardstick of equality of division. As a general guide, equality should be departed from only if, and to the 
extent that, there is good reason for doing so. The need to consider and articulate reasons for departing 
from equality would help the parties and the court to focus on the need to ensure the absence of 
discrimination.’ 
9 White (n 8) [59] (Lord Nicholls). 
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case ‘on an individual basis according to its facts.’10 In other words, the law has been 
designed to provide judges with extensive discretion when determining the outcome of a 
case.11 
 
Issues with the State of the Current Legal Framework 
The discretionary nature of the law has a number of advantages, the foremost of which is 
its aptness to reach ‘tailor-made solutions’ to financial remedy disputes.12 This is 
particularly beneficial in seeking individualised justice for each case. As Lord Nicholls 
provided, ‘fairness requires the court to take into account all the circumstances of the 
case,’ because the ‘features which are important when assessing fairness differ in each 
case.’13 As a result, it may be doubted whether a substantively fair outcome could be 
achieved through the application of an inflexible rule.14 Moreover, this flexibility enables 
the judiciary to interpret the law in a way which appreciates the evolution of social and 
moral values—an especially important trait to the ever-changing law applicable to family 
relationships.15 Therefore, it may be submitted that the discretionary nature of the MCA 
                                                          
10 Catherine Fairbairn, ‘Financial Provision when a Relationship Ends’ (House of Commons Library 
Briefing Paper No 05655, 16 January 2019) 5. 
11 Mary Welstead, ‘Judicial Reform or an Increase in Discretion - The Decision in Miller v Miller; 
McFarlane v McFarlane’ [2008] International Survey of Family Law 61, 63. It has been described as 
‘almost limitless discretion’: Alexander Chandler, ‘When should a party state their case in ancillary 
relief?’ (Family Law Week 2009) <http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed37814> accessed 11 
October 2018. 
12 Lady Hale, ‘What is a 21st Century Family?’ (International Centre for Family Law, Policy and Practice, 
1 July 2019) 11 < https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-190701.pdf> accessed 9 August 2019. 
13 White (n 8) [1], [24] (Lord Nicholls). 
14 Hale (n 12) 11. 
15 Alison Diduck and Felicity Kaganas, Family Law, Gender and the State: Text, Cases and Materials 
(3rd edn, Hart Publishing 2012) 294. 
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is vital to the law in ensuring that financial remedy orders stay ‘in tune with current 
perceptions of fairness.’16 
However, while extensive judicial discretion clearly provides a number of important 
advantages, this legal structure means that the relevant legal rules are, usually, less 
forceful and determinative. A critical consequence of this trade-off is that the law is 
deficient in other areas—particularly legal consistency and certainty. As Jackson 
contends, the wide discretion provided by Section 25 of the MCA is widely recognised as 
being ‘responsible for the inconsistencies…and unpredictability of the present system.’17 
These considerations are relevant because legal consistency, it is argued, is an important 
aspect of the principle of fairness ‘that like cases should be treated alike.’18 Moreover, the 
lack of certainty or predictability can have negative impacts in practice. Indeed, it has 
been observed that it is ‘very difficult for lawyers to predict the outcome of an 
adjudication…[causing] more couples…to bear increasing legal costs.’19 Cretney submits 
that there is a policy objective in ensuring that divorcing couples reach an ‘agreement as 
amicably, quickly and inexpensively as possible.20 By framing the law to provide 
extensive judicial discretion at the expense of clear and definitive legal rules, this is seen 
to impede the attainment of that objective.21 Furthermore, these issues are exacerbated 
when the state of the family justice system is considered. For example, the cuts to legal 
aid for nearly all private family law cases has heightened the need for the law to be clear 
                                                          
16 White (n 8) [26] (Lord Nicholls). 
17 Emily Jackson and others, ‘Financial Support on Divorce: The Right Mixture of Rules and Discretion?’ 
(1993) 7 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 230, 231. 
18 Miller; McFarlane (n 7) [6] (Lord Nicholls). 
19 Jackson (n 17) 231. 
20 Stephen Cretney, ‘Trusting the Judges: Money After Divorce’ (1999) 52 Current Legal Problems 286, 
310-311. 
21 ibid 310-311. 
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and accessible.22 This is because the legal aid cuts have caused an increase in the number 
of self-represented litigants (otherwise known as litigants in person), which results in 
slowing down ‘the progress of a hearing, leading to the case overrunning and increased 
costs.’23 Accordingly, a significant problem with the current legal framework is that the 
presence of extensive judicial discretion has resulted in a law which is unclear, 
unpredictable, inconsistent, and inaccessible to the layperson. These deficiencies may, in 
fact, serve to undermine rather than advance what this thesis will argue to be the law’s 
principal objective: to reach an outcome which is both substantively and procedurally 
fair.24 
Clearly, there is a tension in the law regarding what the appropriate extent of judicial 
discretion and rules is for the law on financial remedies. In heightening the relevance of 
this debate, there is currently a Bill sponsored by Baroness Deech (which has passed 
through the House of Lords and will soon have its second reading in the House of 
Commons25) attempting to enhance the structure of the law and provide greater 
certainty.26 However, this particular attempt to remove a significant portion of discretion 
afforded to the judiciary has faced serious criticism. Lady Hale—as a sitting judge and 
the President of the UK Supreme Court—publicly, and controversially, criticised the Bill, 
arguing that the reduction of the law to a ‘one size fits all’ rule would be unlikely to result 
                                                          
22 Today, private law cases ‘typically involve at least one litigant in person, involve longer hearings and 
return to court more frequently; thus, in private law, the burden on the court is not simply represented by a 
numerical rise in applications’: Andrew McFarlane, ‘Living in Interesting Times’ (Resolution Conference 
2019) 3 <https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/pfd_resolution-april19-1.pdf> accessed 
13 June 2019. 
23 Lesley Cox, ‘Litigants in Person Cases: It Doesn’t Have to Be Like This’ (Family Law Week 2012) 
<http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed97034> accessed 10 June 2018. 
24 This will be discussed in Chapter Two. 
25 Divorce (Financial Provision) HL Bill (2017-19) 310. 
26 ibid. 
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in fair outcomes which reflect the complexity of spousal relationships.27 Therefore, given 
the stark divide present in the rule or discretion debate for financial remedies law, as well 
as the urgency and relevancy of the issue in England and Wales, it is imperative for this 
debate to be thoroughly analysed. Thus, the core theme of this thesis will be searching for 
the appropriate balance between rules and discretion for the specific law relating to 
financial remedy orders. Interestingly, this is an area which many accept to be in need of 
change,28 yet there has been relatively little academic research attempting to achieve this 
end—a gap in the literature to which this thesis responds.  
 
Research Questions 
This thesis comprises several research questions, which are intended to flow sequentially, 
with each conclusion informing the subsequent discussion. Firstly, it will be questioned 
why the law needs to have a balance between rules and discretion. This will lead to the 
critical question of how to determine the appropriate balance for a specific law. The 
approach which is decided to be most effective in pursuing the appropriate balance will 
then be applied to the law relating to financial remedy orders. Through this method, it will 
be queried what the appropriate balance between rules and discretion is for financial 
remedies, and whether the current legal framework aligns with this conclusion. 
Ultimately, this thesis will conclude that reform is necessary to adjust the extent of 
                                                          
27 Hale (n 12) 11. 
28 Welstead (n 11); Baroness Buscombe in HL Deb 27 January 2017, vol 778, col 959 (Divorce (Financial 
Provision) Bill). 
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discretion and rules provided in the statute in an attempt to resolve the deficiencies of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 applicable to the granting of financial remedy orders.  
 
Methodology 
This thesis will approach its central research questions through different research 
methods. Namely, it will incorporate doctrinal, philosophical, historical, and some 
comparative approaches to its analysis. Additionally, it should be clarified which ‘type’ 
of cases will be covered as part of the analysis of this thesis. Broadly speaking, there are 
two classifications of cases in financial remedies: the ‘everyday’ case and the ‘big money’ 
case.29 In the everyday cases, there is usually not a surplus of assets to extend beyond that 
which will be used to meet the needs of the parties. Moreover, the Law Commission has 
noted that in certain circumstances, an equal division of the matrimonial property would 
‘be wholly inadequate to meet the needs of the economically weaker party.’30 It follows 
that in these cases, needs are generally the focus for the courts, as meeting the basic 
requirements of both parties is regarded, ipso facto, as fair. By contrast, in big money 
cases there are assets which extend beyond the needs of the parties, and which are 
distributed according to the sharing and compensation principles. Naturally, the range of 
considerations for the court in these situations may be quite different to those in an 
everyday case. This thesis will aim to address both the everyday and big money cases in 
its analysis, though it is important to be mindful of the fact that the majority of reported 
                                                          
29 Emma Hitchings, ‘Chaos or Consistency? Ancillary Relief in the “Everyday” Case’ in Jo Miles and 
Rebecca Probert (eds), Sharing Lives, Dividing Assets: An Inter-Disciplinary Study (Hart Publishing 
2009). 
30 Law Commission, Matrimonial Property, Needs and Agreements (Law Com No 343, 2014) [4.98]. 
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cases—which will be frequently referred to throughout this thesis—almost exclusively 
involve big money cases. As a result, when this thesis submits normative contentions, 
they are intended to apply to both types of cases. 
This thesis will consist of four separate yet connected chapters. Firstly, Chapter One will 
explore the relationship between discretion and rules from a theoretical perspective, with 
the aim of better understanding in subsequent chapters how these two components of a 
common law legal system can be rationalised in the context of financial remedies law. It 
will be established that a legal system would not properly function if it was solely reliant 
on either discretion or rules, and therefore, a balance between the two is required. 
Naturally, this will be followed by an investigation to discover an approach which can 
determine the appropriate balance between rules and discretion for a specific law. 
Through the illustration of a rule-discretion spectrum—which will be central to the 
subsequent chapters—Chapter One will conclude that the appropriate balance will be 
determined by the fundamental purpose(s) of the particular law under scrutiny. 
The primary aim of Chapter Two is to discern the appropriate balance between rules and 
discretion for the law relating to financial remedies. It will begin with a historical analysis, 
which will assist in uncovering the purpose of the current law. Upon concluding that 
fairness is the overriding purpose of the law, this Chapter will dissect the different 
question of what ‘fairness’ means—revealing a number of objectives subsumed within 
this overarching purpose. Subsequently, it will analyse the tensions between these 
competing objectives subsumed within fairness, and will seek to discern how they ought 
to be prioritised, as this influences the respective weight that should be given to either 
rules or discretion. Ultimately, after a thorough analysis of the purpose of the law, Chapter 
15 
 
Two will conclude that the appropriate position on the rule-discretion spectrum for 
financial remedies is near the middle, with a slight preference for the applicability of 
greater judicial discretion. 
Chapter Three will aim to determine whether the law on financial remedies in England 
and Wales aligns with this ‘ideal’ position and, if not, whether it departs from that position 
to such an extent that it warrants legislative reform.31 This will be approached through an 
evaluation of the extent of discretion afforded by the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, with 
the view of determining whether this is in line with the ideal position. Subsequently, the 
impact that judicial pronouncements in the higher courts have had on the administration 
of the law will be analysed to assess whether this has altered the position of the law. 
Lastly, this Chapter will examine whether the various objectives subsumed within fairness 
are being met,32 and consider whether any shortcomings are attributable to the law’s 
position on the rule-discretion spectrum, or whether they are caused by other factors. 
Upon concluding that the current English and Welsh law is incorrectly situated on the 
rule-discretion spectrum, and that it is failing to attain a number of its core objectives, the 
fourth and final Chapter will consider the way forward. Given its relevance and 
controversy, this Chapter will begin by discussing the Deech Bill, and evaluate a number 
of criticisms it has received. After determining that this Bill should not be adopted, a 
different model for reform will be proposed. This proposal, which will be dubbed the ‘fail-
safe model’, shall attempt to satisfy the theoretical conclusion that the law should slightly 
prioritise discretion, as well as justify and defend its position against potential criticism. 
                                                          
31 Ideal, as argued and interpreted by this thesis. 
32 These are the objectives that will be discussed in length in Chapter Two. 
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Ultimately, this thesis will submit that the fail-safe model represents a compelling reform 
proposal: it reaches a compromise which can appeal to a wide range of family lawyers, 
and it reflects the appropriate position (as concluded by this thesis) on the rule-discretion 
spectrum. 
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Chapter One: Rules and Discretion – A Jurisprudential Analysis 
Introduction 
The purpose of this Chapter is to explore the relationship between discretion and rules 
from a theoretical perspective, with the aim of better understanding in subsequent chapters 
how these two components of a common law legal system can be rationalised in the 
context of financial remedies in family law. Through a jurisprudential analysis in a broad 
sense, the key tensions prevalent in financial remedies—such as certainty and 
individualised justice—can be reduced to the fundamental principles of law regarding 
judicial discretion and rules. It is submitted that the debate over the discretionary nature 
of financial remedies can be most persuasively argued if the key issues are discussed not 
only within the confines of family law, but are also justified according to legal theory; a 
novel approach to this subject.33 For example, in order to convincingly posit that the 
discretionary nature of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 is a strength rather than a 
weakness, it must first be understood what is meant by ‘discretion’. When a judge is 
exercising judicial discretion to reach a fair outcome in a financial remedies case, it is 
necessary to discern the freedom and scope of such discretion and the guidelines which 
exist to confine the extent of its application. If this authority is restricted by certain 
standards, it is important to appreciate their nature—whether it be legal, moral or 
otherwise. Equally, in which situations is a legal official expected (or obligated) to use 
discretion? These are all questions which must be explored before asserting a certain 
                                                          
33 Barry Hoffmaster, ‘Understanding Judicial Discretion’ (1982) 1 Law and Philosophy 21, 26: ‘If one 
looks closer at what writers mean when they use the term “discretion”, some progress can be made, at 
least to the extent of seeing whether genuine disagreement exists, and if so, what the disagreement is 
about.’ 
18 
 
position on the discretion-rules debate, and the coherency of financial remedies law 
generally. 
This Chapter will first explore the difficulties in attempting to define judicial discretion, 
and will subsequently evaluate the jurisprudential debate regarding its meaning. Those 
findings will then lead to an analysis of why it is necessary for any law to establish a 
balance between rules and discretion, as pursuing either to its logical extreme would have 
negative consequences. Naturally, the question which arises is how to determine the ideal 
balance of rules and discretion for any given law. This thesis will argue that the most 
effective approach to this issue is to first discern the purpose of the particular law, which 
will then inform which balance between rules and discretion would be most appropriate. 
Though this project cannot be completed with axiomatic precision, this thesis will draw 
upon an established model in this area34—the rule-discretion spectrum—which can be 
used to helpfully illustrate the ideal balance. Ultimately, this Chapter will conclude with 
an approach that will be utilised in Chapter Two to discover the ideal position on the rule-
discretion spectrum for matrimonial finance law. 
 
The Meaning of Discretion 
The meaning of judicial discretion has been debated for centuries and yet there is still no 
universally accepted definition. As a result, it is widely held that this concept ‘is one of 
the most general expressions in the law.’35 This inherent uncertainty surrounding 
                                                          
34 See, for example, Carl Schneider, ‘Discretion and Rules: A Lawyer’s View’ in Keith Hawkins (ed), The 
Uses of Discretion (OUP 1992). 
35 Richard Spindle, ‘Judicial Discretion in Common Law Courts’ (1947) 4 Washington and Lee Law 
Review 143, 143. 
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discretion is largely attributable to the ‘exceptionally difficult’ nature of the task to search 
for a definition.36 Accordingly, it is worth exploring the reasons which make this task a 
particularly challenging one. One possible reason is the conflicting and unsubstantiated 
interpretations provided by the early judges which have persisted in modern definitions 
of discretion. For example, the oft-quoted statement from Lord Coke, originating in the 
sixteenth century, provides that: 
‘[D]iscretion is a science of understanding, to discern between falsity and truth, 
between wrong and right, between shadows and substance, between equity and 
colourable glosses and pretences, and not to do according to their wills and private 
effections.’37 
Plainly, this—along with most judicial pronouncements on discretion—is not very 
helpful, because whilst a definition is provided, it is merely an assertion lacking any 
further elaboration or supporting evidence. While it may be retorted that, contextually, 
this is understandable given that it is an articulation from the Elizabethan era, later judicial 
opinions suffer the same fate. In the United States, Chief Justice John Marshall rejected 
the concept of judicial power, arguing that judicial discretion ‘is never exercised for the 
purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge, [but] always for the purpose of giving 
effect to the will of the legislature; or, in other words, to the will of the law.’38 However, 
disappointingly for the purposes of this Chapter, there is no further elaboration on this 
interpretation of judicial discretion in the judgment. Marshall directly proceeds to discuss 
                                                          
36 Daniel Kanstroom, ‘Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion and Deference in U.S. 
Immigration Law’ (1997) 71 Tulane Law Review 703, 717. 
37 Rooke's Case (1598) 5 Co Rep 99b. 
38 Osborn v Bank of the United States 22 US 738, 866 (1824). 
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the submissions of the parties of the case. This perfectly illustrates the limitations of using 
judicial views from specific judgments to engage in a theoretical analysis of discretion. 
Given their role as arbitrators to resolve practical legal disputes, their capacity to 
contribute to theoretical research is restricted. 
Furthermore, this is not helped by views which appear to be provocative and overstated 
rather than constructive. For example, during the ‘famous controversy between Lord 
Mansfield and Lord Camden in Doe d. Hindson v Kersey’ surrounding the issue of 
credible witnesses attesting wills,39 Lord Camden described discretion in the following 
way: 
‘The discretion of a judge is the law of tyrants; it is always unknown; it is different, 
in different men; it is casual, and depends upon constitution, temper, and passion. 
In the best, it is oftentimes capricious; in the worst, it is every vice, folly and 
passion, to which human nature is liable.’40 
As Burke posits, such attempts to define ‘judicial discretion’ likely create greater 
confusion than clarity.41 However, it should be noted that a particular insight may be 
gained from reading the perspectives of judges, as the debate surrounding judicial 
discretion is one which raises issues regarding how they perceive their role; whether they 
view themselves as interpreting or making the law. Yet, the inevitable shortcoming of this 
research path is that, inherently, judges are not in a position to properly engage with a 
theory of discretion in their judgments. Therefore, judicial accounts of discretion should 
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common law versus equity which were relevant at the time—in particular, Chief Justice Coke and Lord 
Ellesmere in Earl of Oxford's case (1615) 21 ER 485. 
41 H P Burke, ‘Judicial Discretion’ (1920) 90 Central Law Journal 355, 355. 
21 
 
not form the focus of this Chapter’s analysis, as they merely scratch the surface of the 
concept’s meaning. 
It is submitted that another reason for the complexity of attempting to define discretion is 
‘the many varied efforts in the literature.’42 For academics approaching this issue, it would 
appear that one of the greatest difficulties is not only the amount of literature, but also the 
variance of those accounts. For example, it is Isaacs’ contention that there are at least 
seven distinguishable definitions of discretion.43 Further, confusion is exacerbated by the 
multitude of labels for academic theories which essentially purport the same idea. By way 
of example, Schneider discusses two different types of discretion: that which is either 
created ‘directly and deliberately’44 or ‘indirectly and undeliberately’.45 Similarly, 
Goodin’s work closely mirrors these two categories of discretion, such that discretion may 
either be ‘explicitly written into rule…[or] merely implicit in the statement of rule.’46 
However, he applies the labels of ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ discretion.47 This added 
confusion inevitably contributes to the lack of clarity in the meaning of discretion. This 
thesis will attempt to avoid this difficulty by narrowing its focus to a single debate 
between two jurists: HLA Hart and Ronald Dworkin.  
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Whilst there are many valuable theories on discretion which approach the issue from 
different angles, the decision to direct the attention to the Hart-Dworkin debate is a 
calculated and reasoned one. Primarily, this debate is most useful to this thesis, as it will 
be demonstrated that it closely reflects the debate over discretion in the context of 
financial remedies. Specifically, through Hart’s understanding of discretion as ultimately 
representing a broad legislative power,48 and Dworkin’s theory that discretion is confined 
by legal or extra-legal standards,49 the key points of contention regarding discretion with 
respect to financial remedies—namely its uncertainty, unpredictability, and perceived 
boundless nature—are at the forefront of this jurisprudential clash. As it will become 
apparent over the course of the remainder of this thesis, it is essential to the purpose of 
this project to unpack the benefits and drawbacks of judicial discretion, as these findings 
will be instrumental in analysing and proposing improvements for matrimonial finance 
law. Ultimately, the Hart-Dworkin debate raises a number of issues (including the 
inevitability and scope of judicial discretion) which directly contribute to the broader 
arguments advanced in this thesis. Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that the 
‘type’ of discretion predominantly discussed by both Hart and Dworkin is about the way 
judges approach legal rules, whereas the MCA is an express statutory conferral of 
discretion on judges (i.e. an express grant). However, while this difference is noteworthy, 
it does not dilute the significance of the Hart-Dworkin debate to the broader focus of this 
thesis: the extent of rules and discretion in relation to financial remedies law. This is 
because, what is relevant for this thesis is not necessarily the origin or root of discretion, 
but rather the scope and impact of judicial discretion on the law’s ability to attain its 
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fundamental objectives. Accordingly, the following section will evaluate the theories 
advanced by both the Hartian and Dworkian schools of thought, with the aim of 
discovering which conception of judicial discretion can most effectively guide this thesis 
in its subsequent analysis. 
 
Hart vs Dworkin: The Debate Over Discretion 
HLA Hart’s central work, The Concept of Law, has had a profound impact for 
jurisprudence and legal positivism,50 and has garnered the respect of its strongest 
opponents ‘as a masterpiece worth at least the compliment of careful refutation.’51 In this 
work that he ‘regarded as an essay in descriptive sociology,’52 Hart attempts to elucidate 
the meaning of law and its components,53 for as Austin said, it is crucial to use ‘a 
sharpened awareness of the words to sharpen our perception of…the phenomena.’54 Hart 
postulates that a legal system can be described as a ‘union between primary and secondary 
rules,’55 and that with this claim lies ‘the key to the science of jurisprudence.’56 Crucially, 
the criteria for validity of primary and secondary rules is provided by an ultimate rule of 
recognition, which whilst it has no ‘criteria for the assessment of its own legal validity,’57 
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it must be ‘accepted as common public standards of official behaviour by its officials.’58 
Importantly, secondary rules—such as subordinate rules of recognition—may manifest 
themselves in a variety of forms, including ‘reference to an authoritative text; to 
legislative enactment; to customary practice; to general declarations of specified persons, 
or to past judicial decisions in particular cases.’59 In other words, the validity criteria for 
law derives from a rule of recognition which is accepted and followed by society. 
Accordingly, extra-legal standards which do not originate from the rule of recognition 
cannot properly be considered ‘law’. This core viewpoint has been extrapolated to the 
‘separability thesis,’60 which posits that there is no necessary connection between law and 
morality.61 This brief overview of Hart’s legal positivist conception of law is relevant to 
this thesis, insofar as it explains why Hart holds his views about the notion of discretion. 
Hart’s theory on judicial discretion can be neatly summarised as follows: 
‘The open texture of law means that there are, indeed, areas of conduct where 
much must be left to be developed by courts or officials striking a balance, in light 
of the circumstances, between competing interests which vary in weight from case 
to case…Here at the margin of rules and in the fields left open by the theory of 
precedents, the courts perform a rule-producing function which administrative 
bodies perform centrally in the elaboration of variable standards. In a system 
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where stare decisis is firmly acknowledged, this function of the courts is very like 
the exercise of delegated rule-making powers by an administrative body.’62 
Whilst it is well-known that Hart was far too brief with his explanation of adjudication 
and discretion in Concept, further analysis was discovered in an essay which had never 
been published during his lifetime.63 In this paper, Hart proposes that the indeterminate—
or ‘open textured’—nature of the law is inevitable because of the limits of human 
language, and that legal systems must accept discretion as a necessary mode of decision-
making for two main reasons: the ‘Relative Ignorance of Fact’ and the ‘Relative 
Indeterminacy of Aim.’64 The former evinces that when a new legal rule is created there 
are certain clear applications of the rule that are envisaged, yet nonetheless ‘the totality of 
possible circumstances in which the application of the rule may be drawn in question…are 
not confined to such clear cases.’65 Hart demonstrates this inevitability through the 
example of a rule which clearly states: ‘No vehicles are to be taken into the park.’66 Whilst 
this would evidently cover cars and motorcycles, it is less clear whether the rule would 
also prohibit skateboards or bicycles or toy motor cars. As a result, in order to determine 
the applicability of the rule to any of these unforeseen situations, a judge must search 
beyond the explicit law to resolve the case. For Hart, he must exercise judicial discretion. 
It may be suggested that the courts in these cases need not use discretion, but instead can 
apply a purposive or teleological approach to the rule.67 Accordingly, whilst the creators 
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of the rule may not have envisaged every application of the law, the statutory intention 
can instruct judges as to whether their decision would fall in line with the purpose of the 
rule. 
However, this approach is flawed, as under Hart’s reason of ‘Indeterminacy of Aim’, it is 
posited that searching for the aim of a rule will also inevitably involve the use of 
discretion. Ultimately, there will be a point where the purpose of the rule will have to be 
balanced against the rights and interests of the individuals to whom this rule may apply. 
This is because any aim (unless it is an absolute one, such as, for example, the prohibition 
of torture under the European Convention on Human Rights68), must be curtailed in order 
to accommodate competing interests. Continuing with the example of the ban on vehicles 
in the park, Hart provides that if the purpose of this prohibition is to enhance the safety 
and peace of the park, the indeterminate situations described above are still left 
unresolved. Whether a skateboard may be deemed to be dangerous remains uncertain, as 
it turns on how broadly ‘dangerous’ is interpreted, and such an interpretation would have 
to consider additional interests like the skateboarder’s enjoyment of the park and his 
freedom. Similarly, in the context of financial remedies, the question of special 
contributions (contributions to the welfare of the family that were so exceptional that it 
‘would be inequitable to disregard it’ when determining the shares of either party69) will 
inevitably trigger the exercise of judicial discretion. This is because not only is the term 
‘special’ nebulous, the underlying purpose—acknowledging contributions which would 
be ‘inequitable’ to disregard—is also ambiguous, and therefore open to interpretation.70 
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Accordingly, given the necessity for a judge in these difficult cases to weigh 
considerations beyond that which the rule provides and make fresh judgements in novel 
circumstances (which then become law by virtue of stare decisis), Hart concludes that 
discretion is an inevitable truth of any legal system. However, as Hart recognises in his 
Postscript,  ‘this picture of the law as in part indeterminate or incomplete and of the judge 
as filling the gaps by exercising a limited law-creating discretion is rejected by 
Dworkin.’71 
Dworkin’s initial incisive attack to Hart’s thesis was presented in his Model of Rules I and 
II essays. He began by outlining three different senses of discretion: two of which are 
‘weak’ and one which is ‘strong’.72 The first weak sense of discretion refers to a situation 
where ‘the standards an official must apply cannot be applied mechanically but demand 
the use of judgment.’73 The second weak sense simply provides that the ‘official has final 
authority to make a decision and cannot be reviewed and reversed by any other official.’74 
Lastly, the strong sense of discretion states that an official when making their judgment 
is ‘not bound by standards set by the authority in question.’75 It is Dworkin’s contention 
that Hart’s account of judicial discretion provides that judges are not bound by standards, 
and accordingly that it falls within the category of strong discretion.76 Through this 
assumption, he proceeds to dismantle the legitimacy of strong discretion by way of his 
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analysis of principles—a legal standard binding upon judges yet distinct from rules. For 
Dworkin, there are standards beyond legal rules which make up the law, including, inter 
alia, principles and policies. However, he uses the term ‘principle’ generally to refer to 
all of these standards.77 He defines principles as standards that are to be observed ‘because 
it is a requirement of justice or fairness or some other dimension of morality.’78 Crucially, 
they are different from rules because the former have a ‘dimension of weight or 
importance,’79 whereas the latter simply apply in an ‘all-or-nothing fashion.’80 Following 
Dworkin’s persuasive evaluation of relevant case law,81 it is his submission that principles 
are binding upon legal officials, meaning that ‘he must follow it if it applies, and that if 
he does not he will on that account have made a mistake.’82 Accordingly, he concludes 
that Hart’s representation of strong discretion cannot be plausible, as even if the reach of 
rules fails to extend to a given case, judges are still bound to follow the most relevant 
principles when making their decision. In other words, ‘discretion, like the hole in a 
doughnut, does not exist except as an area left open by a surrounding belt of restriction’;83 
that restriction being the obligation to give effect to relevant legal standards beyond 
‘rules’.  
The major points of rebuttal to Dworkin’s attack against Hart’s conceptualisation of 
discretion can be condensed into his mischaracterisation of Hart’s view on two important 
issues: the existence of principles, and associating strong discretion with ‘Hartian’ 
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discretion. With respect to the former, Dworkin’s claim that Hart views the legal system 
as simply a ‘model of rules’ without the existence of principles and policies is simply 
false. In Hart’s Postscript, he provides that it was never his intention to solely refer to 
rules as being ‘all-or-nothing’, and that he did indeed discuss variable standards in the 
law.84 Whilst Hart’s emphasis on law as a union of primary and secondary rules makes 
Dworkin’s mistake understandable,85 it is clear that this is not Hart’s position.86 Moreover, 
it is important to note that Hart admitting the existence of principles does not necessarily 
mean that he must concede that law is ‘a gapless system of entitlements.’87 The logic of 
the indeterminacy of rules may equally apply to principles, and as a result the submission 
that the law can at certain points be incomplete or indeterminate survives the principle 
attack.88 Secondly, whilst Dworkin identifies Hart’s theory on discretion as falling under 
his category of ‘strong discretion’,89 the similarity between the two is not as close as he 
suggests. Strong discretion is unrestricted by legal standards, such as if a teacher has the 
discretion to pick any five students she chooses for an exclusive trip. In contrast, if a 
teacher was required to pick her five best students for an exclusive trip, this would be 
considered, for Dworkin, an exercise of a weak sense discretion as it requires judgement.90 
It is not, however, Hart’s contention that a judge in deciding hard cases is not bound to 
follow some legal standards. In fact, he provides in the Postscript that the judge’s law-
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making powers are quite different from that of the legislature, in part because they are 
‘subject to many [substantive] constraints narrowing his choice.’91 Accordingly, as Shiner 
states, to suggest Hart’s theory claims that judges are not bound by any legal standards in 
cases requiring their discretion is absurd.92 However, whilst Hart does not promote strong 
discretion, he does contend that at certain points, legal standards—whether it be rules or 
principles—will ‘fail to dictate any decision as the correct one’ due to the indeterminacy 
and open-texture of language, and in these cases the ‘judge must exercise his law-making 
powers.’93 Crucially, the judge’s decision cannot be arbitrary, but rather it must appeal to 
a plurality of reasons (social interests, economic and political policy objectives, morality, 
justice, etc.) to justify a given outcome.94 Importantly, this approach cannot be neatly 
categorised under Dworkin’s labels of strong or weak discretion. While it does not contest 
the claim that judges are bound to follow some legal standards, it is distinct from the mere 
‘hard to determine’95 scenario of weak discretion because there is an element of judicial 
creativity. This thesis proposes the following analogy to illustrate Hart’s theory of 
discretion: the task of filling in a colouring book. You must colour within the lines, but 
you have the discretion to choose whichever colours you believe are most suitable for the 
picture. There is a framework within which you must operate, yet ultimately there is the 
freedom as to how and with what the picture will be filled. On this point, an allusion can 
be drawn to financial remedies. The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 provides guidance for 
judges, yet ultimately one judge hearing a particular case may approach the search for a 
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fair outcome differently from another judge. The weight which they attach to certain 
factors—and indeed the eventual outcome they reach—may differ, despite both aiming 
for the same objective.96 This image is not accurately depicted by either weak or strong 
discretion, and accordingly Dworkin’s attack in his Model of Rules essay against the 
validity of strong discretion, as well as his dismissal of weak discretion as being ‘a 
tautology,’ fails to persuasively defeat Hart.97 
In response to the criticisms of his ‘principle attack’, Dworkin replies with one of his most 
contentious theories98: the right answer thesis. This self-evident theory submits that in 
every case—including hard cases99—‘there will always be a right answer in the seamless 
web of our law.’100 It is his belief that the task of a judge—even in hard cases—is to 
determine the rights which the parties are entitled to, and ‘not to invent new rights 
retrospectively.’ Ostensibly, this is not a radical or controversial position, as it would seem 
unfair for judges to impose new legal rights ex post facto.101 However, the necessary 
implication of this ‘rights thesis’102 is that every legal case has an objectively right answer; 
that irrespective of the novelty of a particular set of facts or the unexplored application of 
a given law, there exists a single correct outcome. The method for a judge to achieve this 
Herculean task is constructive interpretation, a process which requires a judge to satisfy 
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two dimensions: the decision on a point of law must fit within the past political decisions, 
and it must be justified so that it places the law as a whole in its best light.103 Accordingly, 
Sartorius asserts that the duty of a judge should be viewed as searching for the decision 
which best coheres with the entire background of law, politics and morality.104 This, he 
concludes, means there will always be something in the ‘vast body of the law which [will 
provide] a basis for distinguishing one decision as the correct one.’105 Therefore, 
following this theory would suggest that judicial discretion as described by Hart clearly 
does not exist, and that it should not, because such judicial discretion cannot be said to be 
taking rights seriously.106 
However, this theory can be criticised both in terms of legal theory and its practical 
usefulness. Firstly, because Dworkin’s theory is predicated on interpretation, the 
individualised nature of this exercise inevitably means that different judges can reach 
different results, and neither is necessarily wrong. As Couzens purports, ‘appraisals of 
interpretations are only matters of degree and there can be no claim to be the “single best” 
or the “only correct” result.’107 This is devastating to Dworkin’s constructive 
interpretation, because part of the search for the right answer involves reaching a decision 
which portrays law ‘in its best light,’108 and there is no definite way of determining what 
is meant by “the best”. Simmonds astutely notes that given that the method of determining 
what “best” means ‘is itself an interpretative task, we are simply driven back in our search, 
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stage after stage, ad infinitum.’109 This ‘infinite regress’ attached to Dworkin’s theory of 
constructive interpretation raises doubt as to whether a judge could ever reach the correct 
decision. 
Furthermore, Dworkin faces the sceptic challenge, which purports that legal decisions 
cannot satisfy the standards of rationality because of the reality of language and value 
indeterminacy.110 Naturally, in hard cases where the applicable law is disputed or 
unsettled, the crux of the decision lies in value judgement. For example, in Radmacher v 
Granatino—the landmark Supreme Court decision augmenting the weight given to 
prenuptial agreements—the majority’s partiality for respecting autonomy111 clashed with 
Lady Hale’s dissent which raised the concern of discrimination to an economically weaker 
party.112 In such instances, judges may well share the same values, yet equally they may 
disagree on the weight to be attached to certain values—a reality inherent of an 
adjudication process which raises moral, ethical and philosophical issues. As Lady Hale 
stated in Radmacher, ‘some may think it permissible to contract out of the guiding 
principles of equality and non-discrimination within marriage; others may think this a 
retrograde step likely only to benefit the strong at the expense of the weak.’113 
Accordingly, this elucidates that value-laden judgments in cases raising novel or 
contentious issues cannot be neatly explained by Dworkin’s theory wherein judicial 
discretion is negated by the rights thesis, as it is theoretically possible (and indeed 
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demonstrable in practice, as seen in the example above) for there to be a range of desirable 
outcomes which cannot be convincingly justified as representing the single right answer. 
As Lucy puts it, ‘in the face of incommensurability reason is indeterminate.’114 
Whilst it may be argued that ‘epistemic indeterminacy does not imply substantive 
indeterminacy,’115 it must be acknowledged that there is no methodology for how 
Dworkin’s theory can be usefully implemented in practice. 116 Given that it is the practical 
relevancy of a theory on judicial discretion which is required to advance the central 
purpose of this thesis, Dworkin’s conception of discretion can be rejected. Therefore this 
thesis will henceforth regard judicial discretion in a jurisprudential sense as Hartian 
discretion: that ‘there will be points where the existing law fails to dictate any decision as 
the correct one, and to decide cases where this is so the judge must exercise his law-
making powers.’117 Of course, there are laws which may not perfectly fit the description 
of the law running out of reach. Matrimonial finance law under the Matrimonial Causes 
Act 1973 is one such example. Section 25 of the MCA—a statutory legal rule—clearly 
fails to provide a decisive legal framework, as it allows for the judiciary to consider a 
range of factors without any indication of their relative weight or degree of importance.118 
In this context, it is in fact the intention of Parliament to confer discretion to the judiciary 
due to the advantages that this approach offers.119 However, even in this scenario, Hart’s 
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interpretation of discretion remains valid, as the House of Lords recognised this aspect of 
their role as performing ‘a necessary judicial function in the absence of parliamentary 
guidance.’120 In either case, judicial discretion fills in the gaps left by rules. 
 
Balancing Rules and Discretion 
It was concluded in the previous section that the Hartian perspective of discretion is the 
most persuasive, and as such this thesis has adopted the understanding that discretion 
involves a judge exercising law-making authority when the expanse of legal rules has run 
out. Naturally, it is necessary to analyse the consequences of adopting this interpretation 
of judicial discretion. In particular, due to its relevancy to the rest of this thesis, it is 
essential to discern whether, based on this perspective, judicial discretion ought to be 
restricted in terms of the scope of its application and the frequency with which it is 
exercised by the courts. To highlight this matter, it is worth turning to some of the issues 
that would arise if a specific law or legal system as a whole were to be governed by an 
‘overly’ or ‘extremely’ discretionary regime. 
a) Issues arising from too much judicial discretion 
Firstly, it is relatively intuitive that if a legal system were to provide judges with unfettered 
discretion, it would result in great uncertainty of the law, as it would ‘leave persons unsure 
of their entitlements…[and without] justifiable expectation of a decision one way or the 
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other.’121 This is because, as established above, judicial discretion allows the judge to 
decide a legal issue according to their ‘individual sense of what is right and just, 
conscientiously applied,’ taking into account the relevant legal context.122 Before delving 
into why such uncertainty would be undesirable, it is necessary to elaborate on what is 
meant by legal certainty. As Bone highlights, nineteenth century legal conceptualists often 
regarded legal certainty as the maturation of a legal system which led to the establishment 
of principles or standards that ‘had a fixed, determinate meaning, which was knowable.’123 
As a result, the development of these principles into ‘concrete rules’ provided a certainty 
in the law similar to the progression of ‘the fundamental laws or axioms of a scientific or 
mathematical theory to more concrete propositions and theorems.’124 More modern 
theorists, such as Llewellyn, considered the ‘predictability of judicial decision’ to more 
closely align with the concept of legal certainty.125 This interpretation is more useful, as 
it more accurately depicts the reality that, because discretion is an inevitability, the law 
can never be perfectly certain. The value of certainty lies not in the translation of law into 
mathematically calculable equations, but rather in its effects on the people it governs and 
the broader objectives of the State. As Kennedy posits, certainty benefits the former by 
providing them with the knowledge and confidence to proactively adjust their affairs to 
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take into account the consequences of a given law.126 Equally, certainty benefits the 
State’s broader policy objectives by increasing ‘the likelihood that private activity will 
follow a desired pattern.’127 Evidently, legal certainty serves a number of important 
functions which justify it being a valued element of a functioning legal system. 
Naturally, where a law demands or allows for the presiding judge to exercise their 
discretion, the level of certainty and predictability with respect to the outcome of legal 
proceedings is diminished.128 As United States Second Circuit Court of Appeals Judge 
Kaufman disclosed, ‘when I think of any one of my esteemed colleagues on the Second 
Circuit, for example, I cannot predict with certainty how he or she will lean in a case 
allowing for judicial discretion.’129 Certainly, judicial discretion serves a number of vital 
functions and is a necessary component of the law. Yet, simply in terms of its impact on 
legal certainty, discretion contributes nothing ‘in terms of clarity, and little is gained in 
terms of predictability.’130 Though this issue will be explored in considerably greater 
depth in Chapter Two, it is widely asserted that greater legal uncertainty would result in 
fewer cases settling out of court. The reasoning for this position is that ‘if the outcome of 
litigation is highly uncertain, there is a greater chance that the two parties will emerge 
with substantially different estimates of the expected gains from litigating.’131 In the 
context of criminal punishment, studies have shown that reaching settlement agreements 
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prior to a criminal hearing have been impeded where the judge holds greater sentencing 
discretion, as there is ‘more uncertainty about what punishment would actually result from 
conviction.’132 The impact of judicial discretion on the prevalence of settlements may vary 
depending on the area of the law, and as such a focused analysis on settlements in the 
family financial remedies context will be conducted in Chapter Two. For the present 
purposes of this section, it may be concluded that, following predominant perspective 
amongst legal critics, an excessive amount of judicial discretion would, by increasing the 
degree of uncertainty in legal outcomes, ‘raise the amount of litigation.’133 
Finally, the marginalisation of legal certainty could have a harmful effect on the 
possibility for equal treatment. Equal treatment requires legal consistency—an aspect of 
justice commonly summarised in the phrase, ‘like cases should be treated alike.’ The late 
and former Justice of the United States Supreme Court, Antonin Scalia, submitted that 
this value of justice should not be underestimated, as it is ‘a motivating force of the human 
spirit.’134 To highlight its importance, he outlined the following scenario: 
‘Parents know that children will accept quite readily all sorts of arbitrary 
substantive dispositions—no television in the afternoon, or no television in the 
evening, or even no television at all. But try to let one brother or sister watch 
television when the others do not, and you will feel the fury of the fundamental 
sense of justice unleashed.’135 
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The issue with too much discretion, however, is that it is not conducive to such 
consistency in the application of the law. Where judges have freedom to interpret a legal 
issue through the use of discretion, rather than being bound by strict rules dictating the 
outcome of a case which falls within the scope of its applicability, the possibility for like 
cases to be treated differently increases. For example, in the context of financial remedies, 
the substantial extent of judicial discretion immanent in the legal framework has been 
argued to be a contributing factor to the inconsistent application of the law, as well as the 
existence of geographical tendencies of courts to decide cases differently.136 For this 
reason, this method of legal problem solving is not widely believed to satisfy the principle 
of legal consistency.137 Accordingly, it may be concluded that it would be preferable, 
‘even at the expense of the mild substantive distortion that any generalization introduces, 
to have a clear, previously enunciated rule that one can point to in explanation of the 
decision.’138  
Secondly, where there is an excessive amount of discretion afforded to the judiciary, there 
is a real risk of prejudice influencing judicial decisions. As it has been established above, 
given that judicial discretion enters in situations where judgement on a legal issue is 
subject to interpretation, judges may disagree on what is right and just for a particular 
case.139 An important reason why such disagreement may arise is because, while judges 
may act professionally and reasonably, it is widely accepted that their decisions may, in 
part, ‘be affected primarily by their own political, ideological, and socio-economic 
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backgrounds.’140 Certainly, however, it is a fundamental and respected value of 
democracy and separation of powers for the judiciary to remain impartial and 
independent.141 Yet, the emergence of prejudice or bias is generally covert, due to such 
biases being implicit rather than explicit.142 For example, Trope and Thompson studied 
the effect of judicial questioning of individuals grouped into categorical stereotype (such 
as race, gender, etc.), and found that the formulation of their questions was subconsciously 
constructed in a way which sought to quickly confirm the relevant stereotype, rather than 
search for the complete context to disprove the stereotype.143 Moreover, it is argued that 
the insistence on the impartiality of the judiciary and failure to acknowledge the influences 
on judges as humans vulnerable to fallibility does a disservice to the legal system.144 As 
Mills contends, these implicit biases ‘blind adjudicators to their partiality, while the 
doctrine of impartiality protects the blind from seeing.’145 Accordingly, the impact of 
providing the judiciary with too much discretion could exacerbate the issue of implicit 
bias or prejudice filtering into legal decisions, due to the liberty this adjudicative model 
provides.146 
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Furthermore, even if judges when exercising their discretion are not affected by personal 
prejudice regarding a stereotype or their political views, their background may still 
influence the manner by which they reach a judgement. Cardozo outlined four main 
‘directive forces’ which a judge may adopt in adjudication: the method of philosophy, 
evolution, tradition, and sociology.147 While a particular judge’s approach will be 
influenced by the facts of the case and the issues which arise, Kaufman acknowledges 
that, ‘ultimately, the choice reflects the personal bent of the individual judge.’148 While 
diversity in legal approach and interpretation is important for a healthy judiciary, this 
finding becomes concerning in the context of extreme judicial discretion because it is 
increasingly more difficult to ensure that judges reach fair outcomes and to hold them 
accountable. As Kronman puts it, a challenge with judicial discretion is accounting ‘for 
the legitimacy of adjudication.’149 This is because the main safeguard to prevent judicial 
error or misjudgement is ‘the possibility of reversal by a higher court.’150 If the aim were 
to appeal a decision made on the basis of discretion, the prospects of successfully 
appealing are low. For example, in the context of appeals for financial remedies cases, the 
threshold to successfully appeal is set quite high—in part ‘because the courts want finality 
and to discourage people from appealing.’151 Moreover, in the vast majority of family 
cases, this measure of accountability is ineffective as most parties are unable to afford the 
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costs involved in pursuing an appeal. Therefore, while judicial discretion offers a number 
of benefits, it also evidently causes several significant problems if it is left unconstrained. 
b) It is necessary to balance rules and discretion 
Evidently, a legal system predicated on judicial discretion alone would be undesirable, for 
it creates various issues which would harm the substantive and procedural justice of the 
law. The solution to this scenario is to limit the scope of discretion exercised in judicial 
decision-making. Naturally, the method to counteract excessive judicial discretion is 
through the insertion of legal rules when developing a legal framework.152 Rules, as 
opposed to discretion, can be described as ‘all-or-nothing’ obligations which a court is 
compelled to enforce if the factual scenario falls within the ambit of the rule.153 
Importantly, however, an exclusively rule-based legal framework would have its own set 
of problems, the most obvious of which include the lack of flexibility to achieve 
individualised justice and the inadaptability of the law to reflect changing social norms. 
Indeed, Pound submits that ‘unbending rules rigidly administered may not merely fail to 
do justice, they may do positive injustice.’154 Intrinsically, a rule is a broad brush approach 
which is effective in achieving certain objectives. For example, Kennedy uses the example 
of setting the age of majority in the United States to 21 on the basis of the assumption that 
maturity is necessary to exercise free will.155 He eloquently states that ‘if we adopt the 
rule, it is because of a judgment that this kind of arbitrariness is less serious than the 
arbitrariness and uncertainty that would result from empowering the official to apply the 
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standard of “free will” directly to the facts of each case.’156 However, while rules offer a 
number of benefits, framing a law which does not allow for the court to take into account 
case-specific facts is not conducive to pursuing substantive justice, and as such it is 
imperative that the courts are unconstrained from the ‘imperfect generalisations’ of 
absolute rules.157 
Thus, just as rules are necessary to counteract the harmful effects of excessive judicial 
discretion, discretion acts in the same way with respect to the consequences of excessive 
legal rules—discretion serves to ‘fill gaps in rules.’158 Ostensibly, it may be concluded 
that discretion plays a necessary and ‘inevitable’ role in a functioning legal system.159 
Given the symbiotic relationship between rules and discretion—particularly the 
moderating effect they have on each other160—the logical conclusion is that, when 
developing a fair and just legal framework, it is imperative that there is an appropriate 
balance between rules and discretion. Naturally, the question that follows is how to 
determine what the appropriate balance is for a given law. 
 
The Ideal Position on the Rule-Discretion Spectrum 
When taken in the abstract, the task of determining the appropriate balance between rules 
and discretion would appear to be an impossible one. As Schneider notes, concluding that 
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a balance is required ‘leaves us in an irreducibly equivocal position, for it is not possible 
to say a priori what mixture of rules and discretion will best serve in any particular 
situation.’161 Yet, when the project is broken down and contextualised to a particular issue, 
there may still remain hope. For, in light of the analysis of law as language with an open-
textured nature, it is not realistic nor productive to search for an answer to this ‘balancing 
question’ to a degree of axiomatic precision. Rather, it is much more useful to undertake 
an enterprise attempting to narrow down the appropriate balance of rules and discretion 
to an estimation translatable in terms of language. The tool by which this can be 
accomplished is: ‘The Rule-Discretion Spectrum.’ This ‘regulatory spectrum’ involves 
absolute-rules at one end of the spectrum and absolute-discretion at the other.162 Pound 
neatly outlines four different positions on this spectrum: 
‘1) cases governed by and to be decided according to rule in the strict sense-
according to the literal exactness of the strict law; 
(2) cases not within the first category but to be decided by reasoning from 
authoritative principles as starting points, using an authoritative technique guided 
by authoritative ideals; 
(3) cases calling for judicial discretion, i.e., discretion guided by the analogy of 
principles of law as starting points for reasoned determination; and 
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(4) cases left to the personal discretion of judge or official or person authorized to 
act, without any organized grounds of or guides to decision.’163 
This spectrum helpfully illustrates the various ways a legal system or particular law may 
balance the competing elements of rules and discretion. While not perfectly precise, 
reference to the rule-discretion spectrum will allow for simple and comprehensible 
articulations of how a given law should be balanced. 
It is submitted that, when assessing the appropriate position on the spectrum for a law, the 
compass used to guide this evaluation should be the purpose of the relevant law. 
Evidently, the appropriate balance between rules and discretion will vary depending on 
which area of law and which particular issue within that area of law it is covering.164 For 
example, while judicial discretion serves a crucial role in criminal sentencing law and 
family law by allowing the courts to take into account individual circumstances,165 the 
value of certainty provided by rules is much more important for the laws of contracts.166 
Ultimately, the calibration of the balance should be determined according to the objectives 
and the fundamental purpose(s) that the specific law aims to achieve. As Wilson posits, 
the suitability of either rules or discretion will depend ‘upon the underlying purposes of 
the substantive laws being interpreted, and upon the assessment of the costs and benefits 
of applying either technique.’167 Accordingly, it would seem that the approach to 
determining the appropriate position on the rule-discretion spectrum for a given law is to 
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first ascertain its fundamental purpose(s), and then analyse which balance would most 
effectively serve that overriding objective. 
 
Conclusions 
This Chapter has explored the nature of judicial discretion by attempting to find a clear 
working definition which could be utilised in this thesis. Given the prominence of the two 
jurists, the Hart-Dworkin debate regarding judicial discretion was dissected, and it was 
concluded that Hart offered the more persuasive interpretation of discretion: a law-making 
function by the judiciary to fill in the inevitable gaps of legal rules due to the open-texture 
of language and law. Given this understanding of judicial discretion, the consequences of 
framing a law purely in terms of discretion was evaluated, and it was seen that it would 
lead to great uncertainty and bias or prejudice in judicial decisions. Equally, however, 
governing a legal issue solely in terms of strict rules would be undesirable, as it would 
inhibit the attainability of substantive justice. The result of such findings is that a balance 
between rules and discretion is necessary. Ultimately, it was concluded that in searching 
for an ideal position on the rule-discretion spectrum for a given law, it is imperative to 
determine the purpose of that law. Once this has been ascertained, it is possible to deduce 
which mixture of rules and discretion would most effectively promote the achievement of 
the law’s fundamental objective. Accordingly, Chapter Two will follow this approach in 
searching for the ideal position on the spectrum for the specific law relating to financial 
remedy orders. 
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Chapter Two: Searching for the Ideal Balance between Rules and Discretion for 
the Law Relating to Financial Remedy Orders 
Introduction 
It has been seen that a law administered through unfettered discretion can produce 
undesirable consequences, yet equally so too can an overly rigid rule-based legal system. 
Rather, with most laws, a balance must be struck between discretion and rules in order to 
achieve an optimal state of appropriately counterbalancing competing interests. Naturally, 
however, the particular balance may vary from one law to the other—altering depending 
on their nature, history, and purposes.  It therefore follows that the next issue to evaluate 
is how such a balance should be constructed for the specific law applicable to financial 
remedies following divorce or dissolution of civil partnership. As explained in the 
previous chapter, the extent of discretion which is appropriate for a given law depends on 
its overriding (and ancillary) objectives. Accordingly, this chapter will first strive to 
unpack what has been determined the primary purpose of financial remedies law: fairness. 
It will approach this through an evaluation of the historical background leading up to the 
enactment of the Matrimonial Causes Act (MCA) 1973, and will dissect the meaning of 
fairness. Subsequently, this paper will analyse the tensions between competing objectives 
subsumed within fairness, and seek to discern how they ought to be prioritised. Finally, 
after a thorough analysis of the purpose of the law, this chapter will conclude where on 
the rules-discretion spectrum the law applicable to the making of financial remedy orders 
should lie. 
However, it is first worth stating at the outset that there are challenges within this task. 
Firstly, because the MCA does not explicitly mention any overriding purpose or 
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objective168—coupled with the fact that all judgments on this issue qualify their words as 
not intended to be received as more than mere guidance—this thesis does not seek to 
purport that its findings with respect to the purpose of the law are indisputable, nor are 
they unanimously agreed upon. Rather, they are the product of analysis and evaluation of 
the available evidence obtained through the case law and academic commentary. 
Secondly, in relation to the construction of an appropriate balance within the discretion-
rules spectrum, this thesis concedes that, naturally, there is no scientific or quantifiable 
way of determining the answer to this question. However, this should not preclude an 
attempt to approach the issue in light of the significance of this area of law for litigants. 
Accordingly, this thesis will propose a model which can be described through language, 
rather than a numerical or calculable scale—which, while not being exact in its precision, 
can roughly locate the optimal balance between discretion and rules and provide useful 
guidance for questions on reform. 
 
The Purpose of Financial Remedies Law 
Upon a preliminary investigation, it becomes readily apparent that the overriding 
objective for the courts when deciding on the division of assets upon divorce is to reach a 
fair outcome. This was most famously expressed in the House of Lords decision in White 
v White.169 In his seminal judgment, Lord Nicholls states that whilst the MCA does not 
explicitly provide any objective for the courts to follow when deciding these cases, 
                                                          
168 Cowan v Cowan [2001] EWCA Civ 679, (2001) 2 FLR 192 [25]: ‘The original statutory objective 
having proved quite impossible of practical attainment, it was removed in 1984 without anything being 
substituted.’ 
169 White (n 8). 
49 
 
implicitly, it ‘must be to achieve a fair outcome.’170 However, whilst being the most well-
known decision to express achieving fairness or obtaining a fair outcome as the purpose 
of financial remedies law, there were several decisions prior to White which did the same. 
For example, Thorpe LJ in Dart v Dart noted that ‘the purpose of this statute was to make 
fair financial arrangements on or after divorce in the absence of agreement between the 
former spouses.’171 Likewise, Wood J in Page v Page opined that the ultimate aim of the 
statute is clearly ‘to do that which is fair, just and reasonable between the parties in 
rearranging the family finances.’172 Accordingly, as noted in Cowan v Cowan, it is the 
‘almost inevitable judicial conclusion that the unexpressed objective of the [section 25 
MCA] exercise is to arrive at a fair solution.’173 
Yet, the utility of fairness (alone) as an objective may be limited because, as Lord Nicholls 
expressed: 
‘[F]eatures which are important when assessing fairness differ in each case. And, 
sometimes, different minds can reach different conclusions on what fairness 
requires. Then fairness, like beauty, lies in the eye of the beholder.’174 
Rather, what made the decision in White historic was its elaboration on how the courts 
should exercise their discretion to achieve a fair result, as well as what fairness means.175 
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It established what it now referred to as the ‘equal sharing principle’: a concept which 
prescribes that before awarding an unequal division of assets, ‘a judge would always be 
well advised to check his tentative views against the yardstick of equality of division.’176 
Beyond promoting (albeit not requiring) equality, Lord Nicholls mandated that when 
seeking to achieve a fair result, there should be no discrimination between the homemaker 
and breadwinner.177 Accordingly, White represented a landmark decision in financial 
remedies law because, rather than simply declaring that fairness is the law’s fundamental 
purpose, it unpacks the substance behind this ‘difficult and elusive concept.’178 As Diduck 
opines, Lord Nicholls intelligently ‘integrated a principle of equality within non-
discrimination and in turn within fairness.’179 
The reason for this brief overview of the White judgment is to highlight the need for this 
Chapter’s analysis to delve beyond a layperson’s understanding of the ‘purpose’. 
Accepting fairness as the purpose of financial remedies is merely a starting point. Whilst 
the judgment in White provides that equality and non-discrimination are subsumed within 
fairness, they are not necessarily the only elements of fairness. For example, fairness may 
be understood as representing both substantive fairness (a decision and the reasons for 
arriving there) and procedural fairness (the process and practical realities of court 
proceedings). Therefore, it is necessary to unravel what fairness—the claimed overriding 
purpose of financial remedies law—actually means. In pursuit of this aim, this section 
will undertake an evaluation of the historical development of financial remedies orders to 
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determine whether fairness was always the objective, and if not, what its purpose was and 
why it changed. It will also explore the different ‘senses’ of fairness (substantive and 
procedural), and consider how they interact with each other. 
a) Historical development of the law applicable to financial remedy orders: How has 
the purpose of the law evolved? 
Whilst the law regulating marriages dates back many centuries, the starting point for the 
purposes of this paper is 1857.180 This is not only when divorces became available to all 
married couples,181 but also when Parliament created a ‘Court with exclusive Jurisdiction 
in Matters Matrimonial’ which had the authority to order the husband to pay his ex-
wife.182 Under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857, a husband could divorce his wife if she 
was found guilty of adultery, whereas a wife had to prove that the husband committed 
adultery and either incest, bigamy, cruelty, or desertion for at least two years.183 
Evidently, there was significant inequality in terms of the grounds for divorce—a blatant 
double standard.184 As Kha asserts, ‘the Campbell Commission itself had suggested that 
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wives could be expected to forgive a straying husband otherwise divorce would be too 
readily available.’185 
Unsurprisingly, this inequality was reflected in relation to the law regulating the financial 
issues in marriage and divorce. Particularly, it was only in 1882—25 years after the 
passing of the 1857 Act—that married women had the right to own property as her 
separate property.186 Naturally, this placed women in a disadvantaged position when it 
came to receiving a financial remedies order (maintenance, as it was then called) from a 
judge upon her divorce. The Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 provided that, upon divorce, 
the ‘Court may, if it shall think fit…order that the husband shall…secure to the wife such 
gross sum of money…it shall deem reasonable’ (emphasis added).187 Firstly, it is 
important to note the wording of this provision. Providing any financial provision 
whatsoever to the wife was an exercise of discretion for a judge—it was not an obligation 
for the court, nor was it a right which the woman could enforce. Secondly, the statute 
provided that the basis upon which a judge would determine this amount to be awarded 
to the wife was ‘reasonableness’. 
However, it is necessary to discern what ‘reasonable’ meant in its proper historical 
context, and how the judges undertook the search for a reasonable financial provision. 
The practice of the ecclesiastical court prior to the enactment of the 1857 Act was to 
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consider one fifth of the net income a reasonable award for the wife,188 although 
depending on circumstances, that award could be higher189 or lower.190 This ‘one fifth 
rule’ was perpetuated by the Family Courts for many years. As Lord Wilson noted, over 
a century later when he began practising as a family lawyer, he would argue as counsel 
‘that a wife should have a fifth of the joint incomes pending the suit for divorce and a 
third of them following the grant of a decree.’191 Beyond being unfair and discriminatory 
according to modern standards, this structure was also said to be overly rigid and 
arbitrary.192 
Yet, this rule of thumb was a starting point, which could be departed from in either 
direction depending on the individual circumstances of the case.193 From the enactment 
of the 1857 Act until the far-reaching changes introduced through the Divorce Reform 
Act 1969194 and the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 1970,195 marital fault or 
wrongdoing was the focal point for judges when determining a reasonable financial 
award.196 The rationale—which lasted over a century—was that a wife should not have to 
suffer from her husband’s wrongful conduct, and as such there is an obligation for the 
husband to support her after separation.197 Notably, this closely mirrors the law of 
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contract, whereby a breach of contract results in liability to compensate the affected 
party.198 Therefore, this principle which applied to matrimonial finance law was referred 
to as the ‘contractual analogy.’199 As a result, the respective blameworthiness of both the 
husband and the wife became central to a judge’s decision. For example, in Kettlewell, a 
wife obtained a divorce on the ground that her husband was guilty of adultery and 
cruelty.200 He had a substantial annual income of £19,000, and the Court found that an 
adequate permanent maintenance for the wife would be £3,000 per year. As part of Sir 
Francis Jeune P’s reasoning, he noted that ‘where the conduct of the wife has been 
blameless, the allowance should be handsome.’201 
By contrast, where the wife was guilty of adultery and it was the husband petitioning for 
divorce, the consequences for her could be devastating—whether that be in relation to 
their finances or the custody of their children.202 Given that the rationale for financial 
provision orders was a breach in the marriage contract, where the wife was responsible 
for the breach, the courts were extremely reluctant to make an order in favour of these 
‘guilty wives.’203 However, at the turn of the 20th century, the courts began recognising 
the ‘guilty’ wife’s entitlement to a ‘compassionate allowance’204—an award of typically 
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£1 per week ‘so that she may not be turned out destitute on the streets.’205 Crucially, this 
order would be made dum sola et dum casta (as long as she remained single and chaste). 
The reasoning for this was if her livelihood depended on remaining celibate, there would 
be a strong pressure placed upon ‘her not to lapse again into sin.’206 Fortunately, the 
judicial sentiment evolved over time, to the point where they rejected the compassionate 
allowance doctrine on the basis that nowhere in the statute is it stated ‘that a wife against 
whom a decree has been made cannot be awarded maintenance.’207 
This aspect of the court’s historical legal reasoning reveals important aspects of the overall 
objectives of the law. Whilst the statute provided that the courts had to search for a 
reasonable outcome, there appeared to be other factors influencing their reasoning. Whilst 
the compassionate allowance doctrine could be argued to reflect the contractual analogy, 
the condition placed on these maintenance awards for the wife to be chaste suggests an 
interest in the structuring and behaviour of individuals and families. Given the taboo 
nature of divorce at the time,208 the courts were concerned with deterring husbands from 
divorcing their wives, and rationalised that ‘the fact that there was to be no escape from 
the financial ties created by marriage would operate as an important buttress to the 
institution of marriage.’209 This was supported by Lord Penzance, who, in rather dramatic 
terms, proclaimed that: 
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‘[I]t is the foremost duty of this Court in dispensing the remedy of divorce to 
uphold the institution of marriage. The possibility of freedom begets the desire to 
be set free, and the great evil of a marriage dissolved is, that it loosens the bonds 
of so many others. The powers of this Court will be turned to good account if, 
while meting out justice to the parties, such order should be taken in the matter as 
to stay and quench this desire and repress this evil.’210 
Fundamentally, the reason for this concern was the threat divorce posed to the social 
stability that the traditional English family created.211 To this day, marriage remains a 
matter of public and State interest, as it impacts a wide range of issues in society; most 
prominently of which is the development of children.212 For example, there are many 
studies which have suggested that ‘increasing the divorce rate meant increasing numbers 
of disadvantaged children.’213 Moreover, the effects of children being raised in single-
parent families have been shown to be detrimental, with increased likelihood of teenage 
pregnancy and being pushed ‘out of school and out of the labour force.’214 Consequently, 
the rejection of ‘unconventional’ family arrangements spanned wider than simply wanting 
to uphold the institution of marriage. The social structure that marriage created placed 
support and financial dependence on the family unit, rather than the State.215 As a result, 
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it followed that many judges and lawmakers were of the view that the statutory authority 
of the Court when deciding on financial remedies was ‘granted partly in the public interest 
to provide a substitute for this husband's duty of maintenance and to prevent the wife from 
being thrown upon the public for support.’216 Accordingly, beyond reaching a reasonable 
outcome, one of the objectives of financial remedies law under the Matrimonial Causes 
Act 1857 was to preserve the status and solemnity of marriage—motivated by both 
prevailing religious conservatism and the effect of financial obligations as an instrument 
to steer social behaviour. 
During the mid-1960s, the social and judicial attitudes towards divorce law evolved, with 
pressures to move from a regime centred on fault and conduct, to one concerned with 
distributive justice and the real-life consequences for families.217 As the Law Commission 
stated in advocating for the reduced role of fault in divorce cases, ‘the public 
determination that one party is guilty of destroying a marriage causes bitterness and 
distress both to the parties and their children.’218 The official shift in the law began with 
the enactment of the Divorce Reform Act 1969,219 as it restructured the basis upon which 
an individual could obtain a divorce. Rather than shaping divorce around a specific 
matrimonial offence, the only ground of divorce became that the marriage must have 
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broken down irretrievably.220 Furthermore, in order for the court to grant a decree nisi, 
one of five different ‘facts’ needed to support the application. Rather than solely relying 
on fault for divorce, this list of facts created three distinct philosophies: fault (three 
different options221), consent with two years’ separation, and unilateral divorce with five 
years’ separation.222 Certainly, this demonstrated a significant development in divorce 
law, and would lay the foundations for subsequent reform. Yet, while fault played a 
diminished role in divorce law,223 it remained crucial to ancillary relief cases.224 In fact, 
Parliament included this in the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act (MPPA) 1970, 
such that it was the duty for the courts to have regard to the conduct of both parties when 
deciding how to use their statutory powers.225 
The landmark case which removed the centrality of fault and conduct when determining 
financial provision orders was Wachtel v Wachtel.226 Here, the Court of Appeal held that 
the blameworthiness of either the husband or wife to the breakdown of their marriage 
should not affect the order for financial provision, unless the conduct of one of the parties 
is both ‘obvious and gross.’227 Ormrod J reasoned that to punish a spouse for being ‘guilty’ 
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of destroying the marriage failed to acknowledge the complexities of human relationships 
and that: 
‘…shares in responsibility for breakdown cannot be properly assessed without a 
meticulous examination and understanding of the characters and personalities of 
the spouses concerned, and the more thorough the investigation the more the 
shares will, in most cases, approach equality.’228 
Furthermore, while the MPPA 1970 provided that conduct should be a consideration for 
the courts, there was nothing to suggest that this should be construed narrowly, rather than 
being interpreted broadly. Moreover, the statute did not prescribe that conduct has to 
reduce an award, but rather is simply another factor to consider—one which ‘usually 
proves to be a marginal issue which exerts little effect on the ultimate result.’229 
Beyond minimising the importance of fault in matrimonial proceedings, the MPPA 1970 
(later consolidated in the MCA 1973) also made significant additions to the law. The 
statute provided an express objective for the courts, namely: 
‘…to exercise those powers as to place the parties, so far as it is practicable 
and…just to do so, in the financial position in which they would have been if the 
marriage had not broken down and each had properly discharged his or her 
financial obligations and responsibilities towards the other.’230 
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This was later commonly referred to as the ‘minimal loss’ principle.231 However, this 
objective was heavily criticised for various reasons. Firstly, the 1980 Law Commission 
Report on the financial consequences of divorce highlighted the incompatibility between 
the lifelong commitment this objective promoted and the modern day reality of divorce.232 
The argument was that because divorce was no longer a rarity,233 and that consequently a 
growing number of people were willing to terminate an unhappy marriage, the basis of an 
award should not be compensation for the breach of a lifelong marital contract.234 
Moreover, given that the ground of divorce is irretrievable breakdown rather than marital 
fault, the contractual analogy was thenceforth rendered inappropriate and outdated.235 
Finally, in the vast majority of cases, the objective to place the parties in the financial 
position they would have been in had the marriage not broken down was an unattainable 
goal. Given that upon marital breakdown there is the fundamental need of financing two 
homes rather than one,236 ‘in all but a very small percentage of cases the practical 
difficulties of achieving the result envisaged by the Act will be insuperable.’237 For these 
many reasons, it was the firm recommendation of the Law Commission to remove this 
statutory objective. Accordingly, the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 
abolished the minimal loss principle and removed it from section 25 of the MCA 1973.238 
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Conversely, the ‘clean break’ principle was introduced by the 1984 Act.239 This provides 
that when the courts exercise their powers to make a financial provision order, it is their 
duty ‘to consider whether it would be appropriate so to exercise those powers that the 
financial obligations of each party towards the other will be terminated as soon after the 
grant of the decree as the court considers just and reasonable.’240 There are many benefits 
to the clean break principle—such as enabling divorced parties to transition into leading 
independent lives—which allowed it to garner widespread support.241 Naturally, it is 
desirable for the judicial process to minimise animosity and encourage the parties to move 
forward with their lives unhindered by the ending of their marriage.242 However, there are 
limits to the principle’s effectiveness. As Ormrod LJ opined, clean breaks are often not 
possible because the dissolution of marriage does not erase the relationship of a mother 
and father—two lives which are, at least to some degree, inevitably intertwined.243 While 
this argument pertains to the parental obligations of divorced spouses rather than their 
financial circumstances, depending on the age of the children it may be very difficult to 
clearly separate these two factors—particularly with respect to housing and education. As 
a result, while achieving a clean break is desirable if possible,244 the statute expressly 
provides that it ‘is not intended to bring about an unfair result.’245 Thus, while the purpose 
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of the clean break principle is to terminate the financial ties of the parties, this should only 
be done where it is ‘just and reasonable’ to do so.246 
The MCA 1973 continues to govern financial remedies law, and since the removal of the 
minimal loss principle and the addition of the clean break principle in 1984, the statute 
has remained virtually unchanged.247 Yet, despite this legislative inertia, there has been 
substantial reform in relation to the objectives of the law over the past 20 years. Before 
discussing the details of this reform, it is important to question how and why this 
happened. While the courts are afforded a uniquely substantial amount of discretion when 
deciding financial remedies cases,248 they are nevertheless bound to follow the 
fundamental directives set out by the statute. Beyond the clean break principle, within 
which there is a caveat that it must be applied only where it would be just and reasonable, 
there is little in the MCA 1973 by way of any express objectives. However, what the 
analysis of the historical background of financial remedies law has demonstrated is that 
the fundamental purpose of the law has remained fairly consistent—simply transitioning 
from reasonableness to fairness. As mentioned above, the MCA 1857 directed the courts 
to order a financial provision which was reasonable. When the judicial objective evolved 
to become fairness over the course of major statutory developments,249 it could be argued 
that ‘true’ fairness was not attained until much more recent times.250 However, it is 
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arguable that the mirroring of financial provisions to a breach of contract was, in the 
context of society at the time, achieving a fair outcome.251 Since then, it has been 
established that both the minimal loss and clean break principles are to be overridden 
where they would otherwise impede a court from reaching a just and reasonable result. 
Ostensibly, it is evident that the purpose of the law has become to achieve fairness 
between the parties.252 Naturally, this raises the question: if the objective has simply 
evolved from reasonableness to fairness over the course of more than 150 years, how has 
the law been able to change beyond recognition? Put simply, the reason is because while 
the objective of fairness is constant, its meaning is fluid. What was fair 50 years ago is 
very different to what is fair today.253 As Lord Nicholls stated: 
‘Generally accepted standards of fairness in a field such as this change and 
develop, sometimes quite radically, over comparatively short periods of time. The 
discretionary powers, conferred by Parliament 30 years ago, enable the courts to 
recognise and respond to developments of this sort. These wide powers enable the 
courts to make financial provision orders in tune with current perceptions of 
fairness.’254 
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Accordingly, in order to more accurately understand the purpose of the law today, it is 
necessary to investigate what considerations of fairness are present in modern judicial 
reasoning. 
b) Meaning of fairness 
i) Substantive sense of fairness 
Clearly, the challenge is not determining whether a party is entitled to a fair division of 
the assets, rather the difficulty is determining what ‘the requirements of fairness [are] in 
the particular case.’255 As has been established earlier in this Chapter, White v White 
provided that fairness meant non-discrimination between the husband and wife and a drive 
towards equal sharing unless there are good reasons for departing from such equality.256 
Furthermore, it is often an element of fairness to meet the needs of the parties.257 However, 
in the particular context of prenuptial agreements, fairness may prioritise party autonomy 
over needs.258 Nonetheless, it can be deduced that, generally, the core objectives 
subsumed within fairness include meeting the basic needs of both parties, the absence of 
discrimination, and equal division unless there are good reasons for departing from this. 
In order to attain these objectives, it may be contended that the courts should have as much 
discretion as they need. This wide margin of discretion enables the courts to pursue 
individual justice because, as Lord Nicholls stated, ‘fairness requires the court to take into 
account all the circumstances of the case.’259 With over 100,000 divorces of different-sex 
                                                          
255 Miller; McFarlane (n 7) [9]. 
256 White (n 8) [25]. 
257 Miller; McFarlane (n 7) [10]. 
258 Radmacher (n 111) [118]-[120] (Lord Phillips). 
259 White (n 8) [24]. 
65 
 
couples in England and Wales every year,260 it is evidently of great importance to ensure 
that the law protects both spouses’ entitlement to a fair portion of the assets.261 Naturally, 
given that the outcomes of financial remedies cases ‘are highly fact dependant,’262 it is 
logical to conclude that the objective of fairness demands that wide discretionary powers 
are afforded to the judiciary. However, whilst judicial discretion lends itself well to 
achieving the objectives of fairness noted above (needs, equality, and non-
discrimination), this is a rather limited understanding of fairness.  
ii) Procedural sense of fairness 
As provided in Miller/McFarlane, fairness does not simply aim to seek individualised 
justice, but also purports to maintain that ‘like cases should be treated alike.’263 Put 
simply, fairness requires the courts to interpret the law consistently.264 Accordingly, 
whilst it is important for the courts to consider the specific circumstances of each case, it 
is also necessary for them to apply the law in the broader context of the past and present 
case law. Beyond being ‘widely accepted as a core element of egalitarian moral and social 
philosophy,’265 a degree of legal consistency is crucial for practitioners and the affected 
parties to gain a greater sense of certainty and predictability—a consideration which leads 
to a distinct element of ‘fairness’. 
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While this paper has analysed fairness in its substantive sense, it is necessary to consider 
whether there are procedural aspects which can be attached to this overriding purpose. 
Part 1 of The Family Procedure Rules 2010 provides that the overriding objective of this 
procedural code is to enable ‘the court to deal with cases justly.’266 Notably, this should 
not be interpreted as a legislative pronouncement of the overriding objective of financial 
remedies law. Rather, this statutory instrument only mandates the court to give effect to 
this objective when applying or interpreting the rules within this procedural code.267 
Nonetheless, this is greatly relevant to the meaning of fairness in the context of financial 
remedies, as the procedural code prescribes both the ‘procedure for applications in 
matrimonial and civil partnership proceedings’ and the rules for ‘applications for a 
financial remedy.’268 In dealing with a case justly, the court must, insofar as is practicable, 
ensure that it is handled expeditiously, proportionately, cost effectively, and to place the 
parties on an equal footing.269 Furthermore, the court has a duty in facilitating the 
overriding objective to exercise active case management,270 which includes encouraging 
cooperation between the parties, helping the parties to settle the case, and ensuring that 
the case reaches its conclusion quickly and efficiently.271 Therefore, in the context of 
financial remedy orders, it is clear that there are important procedural aspects of the 
overriding purpose of fairness. 
In sum, while fairness is the overriding purpose of financial remedies law, it has multiple 
elements. Substantively, it pursues individualised justice through non-discrimination and 
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the needs of the parties, and suggests that the courts should consider the facts of each case 
and exercise their discretion to reach a fair outcome. Yet, fairness also demands for a 
degree of consistency—for like cases to be treated alike. Procedurally, the courts have a 
duty to deal with cases justly, which includes minimising the costs of proceedings for the 
parties and resolving disputes expeditiously. Many of these aspects of fairness seem to 
clash with each other. Indeed, while individualised justice may best be served through 
wide judicial discretion, this may come at the expense of legal certainty.272 Alternatively, 
an overly rigid legal framework may enhance the consistency and predictability of 
outcomes, but result in widespread unfairness.273 It is, therefore, crucial to determine 
whether these competing objectives (which are all subsumed under the term fairness) can 
be harmonised, and if not, how they should be prioritised. 
 
The Relationship between the Competing Objectives 
In order to determine where the law on financial remedies should be placed on the rules-
discretion spectrum, it is necessary to understand the relationship between the multiple 
objectives subsumed within the overriding purpose of fairness. Firstly, this section will 
evaluate whether these objectives are actually incompatible, and if so, decipher the 
reasons for this. It will approach this by examining whether a particular objective could 
be pursued absolutely without abandoning the other objectives. This section will then 
move on to assess how the multiple objectives should be balanced. This will involve a 
detailed discussion of whether any factors should be prioritised, rarely derogated from, or 
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dispensed with when necessary. Ultimately, this Chapter will conclude with a model to 
represent the relative value of each objective—the aim of which is to direct the analysis 
of the optimal point on the rules-discretion spectrum in the subsequent and final section 
of this Chapter. 
a) Can the competing objectives be harmonised? 
In an attempt to reconcile these multiple objectives, it is encouraging that they do in fact 
share commonalities. Most obviously, they inherently share the same fundamental 
purpose. Whether it be non-discrimination or legal certainty, both of their virtues lie in 
their contribution to fairness in the application of the law. Accordingly, it was the view of 
Geoff Hoon, parliamentary secretary to the Lord Chancellor’s Office, that the solution for 
an optimal law ‘must be to deliver a greater sense of certainty for the parties, without 
preventing the courts from ensuring that the outcome of cases is, as far as possible, fair 
and just to all concerned.’274 This suggests that an optimally constructed law on financial 
remedies requires a symbiotic relationship between substantive and procedural elements 
of fairness. However, it is important to highlight the caveat that was included in Hoon’s 
statement: certainty should not, ‘as far as possible’, prevent the courts from reaching fair 
and just outcomes. This demonstrates why, fundamentally, the objectives of procedural 
fairness and substantive fairness will inevitably clash. One cannot be pursued without 
compromising the other. The reason for this is that the regulatory framework required to 
most effectively advance procedural fairness is rule-based, whereas substantive fairness 
is most efficaciously promoted through a discretionary legal system.275 As discussed in 
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Chapter One, a legal system which relies solely on discretion would be problematic and 
undesirable, just as would an entirely rule-based system. Accordingly, a law whose aim 
is to achieve individualised justice absolutely would come at the expense of other vital 
objectives subsumed within fairness. Moreover, tailoring a legal system to solely focus 
on being sufficiently flexible to adjust according to the individual circumstances of each 
case is a futile mission, as even within the widely discretionary jurisdiction of section 25 
MCA, it is recognised that ‘no family judge in exercising this jurisdiction can achieve 
perfection.’276 As a result, given that perfect ‘justice’ is both impossible in practice and 
detrimental to the other objectives, ‘a willingness to entertain some trade-off between 
simplicity and aspiration is not only the counsel of prudence, it is also a precondition for 
justice in the broad run of cases.’277 Equally, an overly structured regime which aims to 
uncompromisingly achieve legal consistency and certainty would adversely affect the 
attainability of reaching a substantively fair outcome. For example, it has been suggested 
that ‘it matters less [which] rules are chosen than that whatever is done is clear and applied 
with consistency, for that at least will be fair.’278 However, the obvious flaw with this 
statement is that it would be plainly unjust to consistently apply a discriminatory law. 
Consistent application of the law contributes to fairness, but it is not the only factor when 
assessing whether a law is just. Accordingly, to pursue both strands of fairness—certainty 
and fair outcomes—the law requires a ‘resolution of [these] two objectives, each 
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intrinsically desirable, but perhaps mutually inconsistent.’279 In other words, an 
appropriate balance is required.  
b) How should the competing objectives be balanced? 
It has been proven that a compromise is required because it would be undesirable to pursue 
any of the objectives underpinning the overreaching objective of fairness absolutely, as 
that involves the abandonment of other important policy aims. However, while balance is 
necessary, it must be determined how the relevant objectives should be weighed relative 
to each other. For example, whilst uncompromisingly pursuing individualised justice has 
been demonstrated to be detrimental, should it be prioritised over legal certainty? In 
approaching this question, this thesis will discuss three important objectives of financial 
remedies law subsumed within fairness (as established above), and evaluate whether 
prioritising individualised justice is the best means of pursuing these three objectives, or 
if indeed favouring certainty in the balance is more effective. The three objectives, which 
shall be discussed in turn, are: efficiency, procedural fairness (in particular, legal 
consistency), and the absence of discrimination. 
i) Efficiency 
Firstly, it is necessary to elaborate on the meaning of this term. Beyond simply resolving 
a case quickly, it also encompasses the benefits this provides, including saving expenses, 
minimising animosity between the parties, and enabling the parties to restructure their 
lives apart from one another. This is supported by the ‘Supporting Families’ consultation 
document, which expressed as a policy objective the importance of reaching an 
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‘agreement as amicably, quickly and inexpensively as possible.’280 Whilst it may be 
argued that the focus of lawmakers’ attention in relation to this objective should be 
pushing methods which promote greater efficiency in the courts, the more effective 
approach is to concentrate on the role of negotiations outside of the courtroom. By 
avoiding contested litigation and settling the issues privately, both parties unquestionably 
benefit from saving costs in legal fees, resolving matters more quickly, and ending the 
financial remedy proceedings in agreement.281 Given the central role that negotiation has 
in the efficiency of financial remedy cases, it must be considered whether this is most 
effectively encouraged through a legal framework which prioritises certainty or 
individualised justice. 
At first glance, it would appear that with a greater degree of legal certainty, the parties in 
divorce cases would be more likely to settle their dispute. As Brake contends, a system 
based on fixed rules ‘provides a manner of property division that is inexpensive, 
predictable, and able to minimize the need for litigation.’282 By allowing the parties to be 
aware of and understand their rights under the law, it removes the scope for disagreement 
and influences them to accept the proposed outcome. This effect has been demonstrated 
in California through their Family Law Act of 1969, which introduced no-fault divorce 
and a requirement of equal division of community property.283 Research studies have 
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shown that, as a result of this reform, divorcing couples in California have demonstrated 
‘increasing propensity to divide their property out of court.’284 It is argued that by 
‘allowing divorcing couples and their attorneys to predict the type of settlement they can 
expect in court,’ the clarity of the legal requirement—equal sharing of community 
property—has facilitated negotiation and agreements on financial provisions outside of 
court.285 Following this premise, a legal framework which prioritises individualised 
justice, and therefore diminishes legal certainty, would have an adverse effect on the 
promotion of negotiations and efficiency. As Rheinstein posits, a lack of predictability 
inhibits agreements on property issues, as the parties ‘need a firm basis upon which to 
negotiate.’286 It is argued that this degree of certitude is essential to reaching settlements 
outside of court because it allows the parties to understand ‘exactly what he or she stands 
to gain by proceeding to court.’287 
However, it is precisely this uncertainty of the outcome of court proceedings which leads 
Harris to submit that unpredictability facilitates settlements and, therefore, ‘increased 
predictability might in some circumstances provoke litigation.’288 In support of these 
assertions, Harris references two research studies. Firstly, he submitted that a 2003 
study289 suggested that uncertainty regarding a court’s decision if a case went to trial ‘may 
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be a significant deterrence to people contemplating breaches of the civil law because it 
hinders them in calculating the costs and the benefits and in managing the risks.’290 
However, beyond the fact that this study inquired into uncertainty in the context of 
criminal and tort law,291 the circumstances of deterring wrongful (criminal or civil) 
behaviour are far removed from negotiating financial remedies in the context of divorce. 
Accordingly, little weight should be afforded to this authority. The second research study 
cited is a 2006 article, wherein it is argued that, in the context of child support, greater 
uncertainty as to the judge’s decision increases the incentive for risk-averse parents to 
cooperate outside of court.292 Harris rationalises this on the basis that where the ‘court 
may do anything,’ there is good reason for the parties to gain ‘some control over the risks 
and their management through negotiating rather than litigating.’293 This is a forceful 
argument, and is particularly compelling when applied to the ‘everyday’ case where few 
assets are owned by either party and thus available for distribution.294 Under these 
circumstances, parties are more likely to be risk averse, as an unfavourable outcome in 
court could be, in financial terms, incredibly damaging.  However, there are two points to 
be noted with respect to this study’s findings. Firstly, though a subtle difference, the 
conclusions were made in relation to child support, not the division of assets upon divorce. 
Evidently, the dynamics involved in deciding to negotiate are different when it regards 
dividing property with a former spouse as opposed to supporting a child.295 Beyond this 
                                                          
290 Peter Harris, ‘The Miller Paradoxes’ [2008] Family Law 1096, 1100. 
291 Baker, Harel, and Kugler (n 289) 468. 
292 Bruno Deffains and Eric Langlais, ‘Incentives to cooperate and the discretionary power of courts in 
divorce law’ (2006) 4 Review of Economics of the Household 423, 433. 
293 Harris (n 290) 1100. 
294 Jonathan Herring, Rebecca Probert, and Stephen Gilmore, Great Debates in Family Law (2nd edn, 
Palgrave 2015) 248. 
295 Mary Ann Glendon, ‘Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law’ 
(1985-1986) 60 Tulane Law Review 1165, 1178. 
74 
 
point, it should also be noted that the article concluded that in enhancing cooperation in 
between parents, their ‘recommendation should be to promote indicative guidelines and 
not to impose restrictive calculus.’296 Notably, while this conclusion suggests that 
compelling a judge to reach a particular decision might not facilitate negotiation, there 
must nonetheless be a framework which recommends the typical outcome.297 
Accordingly, it cannot be affirmatively deduced that prioritising individualised justice 
facilitates negotiation. 
Lastly, it is worth discussing the implications of the ‘efficiency’ debate in relation to 
vulnerable individuals. Whilst it is evidently a clear policy objective to promote and 
increase the number of cases resolved outside of court, it should be considered how this 
would impact divorcing couples. In particular, it is submitted that a greater degree of 
certainty is central to the protection of vulnerable parties during the negotiation process. 
Naturally, where legal standards are imprecise in order to create the flexibility necessary 
for individualised justice, it becomes imperative that both parties seek legal advice to 
allow them to understand, roughly, what the outcome will be if they enter court 
proceedings.298 However, this creates two problems: an imbalance in negotiating power 
and a reduction in efficiency. Firstly, as Glendon argues, where it is difficult to provide 
clear advice as to how a case will likely conclude, ‘the economically stronger party gains 
negotiating leverage from the superior ability to prolong negotiation, to engage in 
expensive pre-trial discovery, and to use preliminary court appearances for 
harassment.’299 Whilst the court procedure rules and the judge’s case management can 
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‘counteract the additional bargaining power enjoyed by whichever party has no pressing 
need to bring matters to a conclusion,’300 this protection for the weaker party does not 
exist when bargaining in the shadow of the law. Accordingly, if the legal standards are 
unclear, this provides the financially (or emotionally) more powerful spouse an 
advantage, as there will be more scope for bargaining on a wider range of outcomes, 
thereby enabling the stronger party to apply strategy and tactics as part of the 
negotiations.301 Furthermore, it should be recognised that the centrality of power in 
negotiations inevitably has an impact of gender inequality, as ‘women typically hold less 
power…in marital relationships than men.’302 Thompson notes that stereotypes and tropes 
about women can weaken the wife’s bargaining power, as she will be perceived as ‘an 
undeserving gold-digger or parasitic alimony drone if she asks for more money than her 
spouse is willing to part with.’303 As mentioned above, the second issue with vague legal 
standards in relation to negotiations is the reduction in efficiency. It would be ideal for 
parties in financial remedy cases to receive legal advice in order to, at the very least, ‘learn 
what his bargaining chips are.’304 Yet, the reality is that, as a result of legal aid cuts in 
2012,305 the number of cases involving litigants in person have dramatically increased.306 
Statistics suggest that in 36% of private law applications neither party was represented,307 
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and in 80% of all family court cases at least one party did not have legal representation.308 
With respect to the discussion of efficiency, the main harmful effect of these legal aid cuts 
is that, as Cox notes, ‘a litigant in person will usually slow down the progress of a hearing 
leading to the case overrunning and increased costs.’309 This is understandable, as these 
litigants are often new to legal proceedings and may be ‘uninformed participants in the 
process.’310 Nonetheless, the unfortunate reality is that the increasing number of litigants 
in person will have negative consequences to the efficiency of financial remedy cases. 
This is supported by psychological research which has consistently found that individuals 
will consider the legal arguments which favour their position as being most compelling, 
and that the negotiation process may often be hindered by the ‘self-serving biases’ of 
parties to a case.311 As a result, the Law Commission has taken the view that the present 
discretionary system is not ‘sustainable for the future,’ as the reduction of legal aid and 
the improbability of benefitting from adjudication means that ‘individualised fairness is 
in any event largely unavailable.’312 Accordingly, in order to facilitate both the negotiation 
and court process for the growing number of litigants in person, having a greater degree 
of legal certainty and clarity would be preferable. 
In conclusion, when considered in theory, the arguments for certainty and for 
individualised justice are evenly balanced. However, when considering the additional 
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real-life factors of the imbalance of bargaining power (typically) along gender lines and 
the harmful consequences of drastic legal aid cuts, this paper submits that, in the interests 
of efficiency, certainty should be, to a limited extent, prioritised over individualised 
justice. 
ii) Procedural fairness (legal consistency) 
Clearly, if ‘fairness’ was narrowly defined to simply mean achieving a just result in each 
case by considering their specific circumstances, a model prioritising individualised 
justice would be best suited for this. Rather than engaging in a tautological discussion, 
this section will evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of prioritising certainty or 
individualised justice in relation to a distinct element of what makes an outcome 
procedurally fair: legal consistency (like cases should be treated alike). 
To begin, it would seem natural for a greater emphasis on certainty to enhance the legal 
consistency in judicial decisions. Schneider reasons that clear rules make it more probable 
that like cases will be decided alike, not only because they minimise the scope for the 
judge’s opinion to influence the outcome, but also because they may ‘serve as record-
keeping devices, so that decision-makers can more easily coordinate their rulings over 
time and among themselves.’313 As a result, this ameliorates the prospect of judicial 
reasoning and decisions ‘to develop an internal coherence.’314 By contrast, it may be 
argued that where legal standards are vague in order to serve individualised justice, it 
follows that ‘decisions will have to continue to be made on a pragmatic, and individual 
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basis.’315 As a result, many commentators have attributed the inconsistencies experienced 
in the present system to the lack of clear legal guidance.316 Accordingly, O’Sullivan 
contends that such a system fails to achieve fairness in the broad sense, as consistency is 
a fundamental part of justice.317 However, the powerful rebuttal to this position is that 
certainty, by failing to take into account all of the particular facts of an individual case, 
would in fact be counterproductive to the efforts of securing legal consistency. As Harris 
states, the issue with ‘strict rules’ is that they will result in nearly identical cases being 
treated entirely differently due to ‘an insignificant difference between the cases.’318 He 
highlights this with the following hypothetical scenario: 
‘Compare two cases identical in every way, except that by chance alone, in one 
case, the asset is acquired by the husband-to-be the day before the marriage and, 
in the other, by the husband the day after the marriage. In the first case, applying 
the strict rule [referring to Scottish law], the non-owner spouse would have no 
claim in respect of the asset, in the second case she would.’319 
Beyond the issue that similar cases will be treated wholly differently because of what 
should be an inconsequential difference in fact, the broad-brush nature of strict rules 
means that seemingly divergent cases may be grouped together.320 In this sense, different 
cases may not be treated differently. These are compelling arguments which undoubtedly 
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weaken the position of certainty in this particular debate.321 Accordingly, Harris 
concludes that the certainty acquired through strict rules would not enhance the legal 
consistency necessary for fairness, as it would inevitably produces arbitrary decisions.322 
In response to this criticism of certainty, it may be posited that while the difference used 
in Harris’ example is a subtle one, lines must be drawn to create a workable framework, 
and that couples should be aware of the law and act responsibly.323 Moreover, where 
couples find that the default rules do not appropriately reflect their relationship, they have 
the opportunity to contract out of them through a marital property agreement.324 However, 
it is important to appreciate the unique context of family law. For most couples, they will 
never consider the legal implications of divorce while they are still married—even less so 
before their marriage. While uncompromisingly applying a standardised rule in 
commercial law is welcomed,325 in family law it would result in manifest unfairness and 
overlook the complex (and at times irrational) behavioural dynamics of interpersonal 
relationships.326 
The stronger reply to Harris’ argument is that a system which is overly flexible would 
suffer the same fate. As submitted above, vague legal standards will result in a variance 
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in judicial determination on the issue, which would lead to inconsistency. However, this 
does not necessarily mean that one or both decisions are not fair. As Ellman notes, for 
most decisions reached in this area, there will often be a range of ‘alternative [outcomes] 
with equal or nearly equal claims to being fair.’327 However, whilst this variability is 
inherent to a legal framework underpinned by ‘fairness’, it is submitted that ‘the fact that 
reasonable judges can differ on how to decide identical cases does not mean it is a good 
idea that they do.’328 For if they are consistently inconsistent, the law would fall into the 
same trap that it did under overly rigid rules: arbitrariness. Rather than the rules 
themselves being arbitrary, it would result from the random selection of which judge hears 
the case. 
More crucially, beyond dissatisfaction with outcomes in cases, a troubling concern is 
where experience and trends reveal ‘a considerable difference in approach and outcome 
depending on the judge who hears the case.’329 Where judges and regions gain a reputation 
for deciding cases in a particular way, different from other courts across the country, this 
raises the problem the Law Commission for England and Wales has dubbed ‘forum 
shopping.’330 This, they explain, is where ‘practitioners choose particular courts in order 
to get the result their clients want.’331 Given that lawyers will try to best serve the interests 
of their client, the fact that practitioners may be taking advantage of judicial biases is 
unsurprising. A Resolution survey revealed that the majority of solicitors who responded 
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agreed that ‘they had issued proceedings in a certain court centre or area of the country 
because they believed the result would be more favourable for their client than issuing 
elsewhere.’332 This has also formed part of the substantial criticism of the extremely 
discretionary Irish law on financial remedies.333 Practitioners have described the stressful 
and incomprehensible daily routine, whereby the scheduling of a case will either bring 
relief or concern ‘depending on whether they act for the husband or the wife and see which 
judge is sitting for their case.’334 This concern is founded in the reality of their professional 
experience, and has been buttressed by academic findings which conclude that the 
financial provision ‘may vary quite substantially depending on how the case is 
scheduled.’335 The existence of practitioners exploiting these judicial biases, it seems, can 
be at least in theory accepted by Harris. In a separate piece (co-authored by George and 
Herring) discussing the Supreme Court decision on prenuptial agreements,336 Harris 
deems it relevant to note the backgrounds (gender and practice area specialisms) of the 
Justices in the majority and contrasts them with the minority, clearly implying the 
potentiality of personal biases to have influenced their decision.337 Raising this subject 
was entirely justifiable, as in that case, Lady Hale—the only Justice dissenting from the 
majority judgment to afford greater weight to prenuptial agreements—recognised that 
‘there is a gender dimension to the issue which some may think ill-suited to decision by a 
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court consisting of eight men and one woman.’338 This appears to evidence the claim that 
judicial biases can, and do, exist.339 Ostensibly, while there is a strong case in favour of 
individualised justice to contribute to legal consistency, the arbitrariness argument used 
to attack certainty appears to be a double-edged sword. 
As a concluding remark, it should be reiterated that from the outset, it was conceded that 
a legal system which prioritises individualised justice would evidently best serve the 
substantive branch of fairness. However, this section has argued that in terms of achieving 
a procedurally fair outcome, the benefits of certainty with respect to consistency outweigh 
those of individualised justice, but only marginally. 
iii) Absence of discrimination 
Thirdly, this thesis will briefly consider the impact that prioritising either certainty or 
individualised justice would have on the levels of discrimination. It may be reasoned that 
if the relevant rules are set at a standard which reflects the marriage as an equal 
partnership,340 this could guarantee the absence of discrimination. This is the view that 
Chan takes, positing that the gender imbalance pervasive in traditional marriages is best 
remedied upon divorce through ‘a presumption of equal sharing.’341 Given that women 
are generally the weaker economic party through assuming responsibility for numerous 
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unquantifiable non-economic contributions to the family unit,342 having a clear rule of 
equal sharing could moderate this disparity.343 However, this position has been heavily 
criticised, with commentators submitting that a strict equal division rule would have the 
effect of ‘impoverishing women, and not to equalise the historical gender divide in the 
home.’344 This, Hale opines, is because where there is a large discrepancy between the 
earning capacity of the husband and wife, an equal division of the matrimonial property 
would place the homemaker in a position of significant economic disadvantage.345 It has 
been argued from a feminist perspective that providing more than an equal portion of the 
marital assets would ‘encourage women to remain economically dependent and families 
to remain patriarchal.’346 Yet, empirical data suggests that a strict rule of equal division 
of marital assets may perpetuate discrimination against women,347 as has been 
demonstrated in California. Studies conducted in the late 1980s and 1990s indicated that 
the economic status of women in Los Angeles dropped 33%,348 compared to a 10% 
increase for men.349  
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Interestingly, the statistics for the long term economic impact of divorce in the England 
and Wales—a jurisdiction which ostensibly prioritises individualised justice—would 
appear not to be any more favourable to women. According to a 2009 publication, it is 
claimed that ‘following divorce, the income of men increases by about 23%, while that of 
women falls substantially by 31%.’350 Notably, this study includes divorces which were 
decided post-White—a case which declared the importance of non-discrimination 
between the homemaker and breadwinner. On the basis of these comparative statistics, 
the experience of these two jurisdictions demonstrates less of a difference in their 
respective levels of discriminatory outcomes than expected. Therefore, it is submitted that 
rather than the priorities of the financial remedies law being the cause for discriminatory 
consequences for women after divorce, the root of the issue can likely be attributed to 
gender roles and the traditional division of labour which, while in the decline, continues 
to persist in modern society. Evidently, this is a subject which spans far beyond the scope 
of this paper. Accordingly, for the purposes of this section, it can be concluded that 
prioritising either certainty or individualised justice within the specific law relating to 
financial remedy orders will have relatively little impact on the levels of discrimination 
present in the long-term economic consequences of divorce. In aiming to reduce 
discrimination from the law, it has been demonstrated that neither certainty nor 
individualised justice provide strong justifications to claim supremacy. 
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iv) Ideal balance of competing objectives 
The discussion above has demonstrated that the competing objectives of certainty and 
individualised justice are both pursued when attempting to achieve the overriding purpose 
of fairness in the law relating to financial remedy orders. However, in doing so, they 
inevitably clash and promote certain interests at the expense of others. For example, it 
was concluded that certainty was marginally more effective in promoting the efficiency 
of the legal system, particularly in light of the current state of a lack of legal representation 
for litigants in family law cases. Furthermore, after defending the ‘arbitrariness’ attack, 
certainty was also held to be slightly more important for ensuring consistency in the 
application of the law, as it restricts the scope for diverging interpretations of the 
applicable legal principles. By contrast, prioritising individualised justice was considered 
to be obviously more effective in securing substantively fair outcomes, and equally as 
important as certainty for the protection against discrimination. It has also been 
demonstrated that different jurisdictions disagree on the relative value that prioritising 
certainty and individualised justice provide to the law on financial remedies. Whilst 
Ireland clearly places significantly more weight on individualised justice, California has 
been shown to prioritise certainty through its strict rules.351 The question, therefore, is 
how should these competing objectives be prioritised or balanced in order to create an 
ideal legal framework? 
It is contended that the law on financial remedies should establish a clearly balanced 
approach, with a slight prioritisation of individualised justice. Plainly, the analysis of 
                                                          
351 It should be noted that, given its relevance, Scotland’s approach will be examined in Chapter Four. 
86 
 
efficiency, consistency, and substantive fairness demonstrates that the competing 
objectives are almost equally able to present compelling justifications for being prioritised 
over the other. The primary reason for (slightly) preferring individualised justice is 
because, while family law serves a wide range of interests,352 ultimately it is traditionally 
recognised that the crux of financial remedies cases is resolving issues between 
individuals.353 Naturally, the main priority of divorced spouses when entering legal 
proceedings is to not only receive a fair decision, but also for the judge to appreciate the 
specific facts of their case which reflects the unique relationship they shared. Furthermore, 
the modern trends towards private ordering,354 such as the reform proposals for no-fault 
divorce,355 suggest that society is placing greater value on the personalisation of the law 
in order to accommodate their particular needs. As Dewar notes, ‘family law has become 
more responsive to the needs of those it affects and is consistent with the view that private 
law in general should develop so as to permit ‘many autonomies’ rather than operating in 
a traditional ‘top-down’ way, by imposing one set of values and ideas on everyone.’356 
Notably, it has been asserted that there are extremely high rates of dissatisfaction with 
litigation regarding financial remedies, and that this is attributable to the extent of 
discretion afforded to judges.357 Instead, litigants may be more satisfied with rules as it is 
easier to perceive fair and equal treatment.358 However, to condemn discretion as being 
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the cause of dissatisfaction with litigation is an overstatement, as the more ‘potent source 
of discontent with the divorce process must be that in most divorce cases there are no 
winners.’359 Ultimately, given the fundamental role certainty plays in securing the 
significant interests of consistency and efficiency with the law, individualised justice, 
while being incredibly important, should not be overvalued.360 Rather, it is contended that 
a nearly even balance should be drawn, but with a slight prioritisation in favour of 
individualised justice over certainty. 
 
Conclusions: Ideal Position on the Rules-Discretion Spectrum 
The conclusion reached in the prior section directly informs which position on the rules-
discretion spectrum this thesis will argue to be ideal for financial remedies law. This is 
because, as previously discussed, a rule-based framework is best suited for serving the 
interests of procedural fairness and certainty, whereas a discretionary framework is most 
effective in promoting individualised justice.361 It follows, therefore, that if a law’s 
objectives are most effectively pursued through the provision of greater weight to 
certainty, the legal framework should be positioned closer to the ‘rule’ end of the rule-
discretion spectrum. Conversely, if the law’s objectives are more successfully attained 
through the prioritisation of individualised justice, then the legal framework should reflect 
a position on the ‘discretion’ end of the spectrum. Given the fact that, in pursuing the 
overriding purpose of fairness, it has been concluded that individualised justice should be 
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marginally prioritised over certainty,362 this can be translated into marginally prioritising 
discretion over rules. Critically, this prioritisation is only a slight one, and therefore 
conceptually the position should be viewed as very close to the middle of the rules-
discretion spectrum. Finally, it should be noted that in the fourth and final Chapter of this 
thesis, a model for reform will be proposed which attempts to illustrate this marginal 
prioritisation of discretion over rules on the spectrum. Accordingly, it is intended that the 
proposal in Chapter Four should clarify what the findings of Chapter Two will look like 
in practical terms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
362 As determined in the ‘Ideal Balance of Competing Objectives’ section of this Chapter. 
89 
 
Chapter Three: Does England & Wales Reflect the Ideal Balance between 
Rules and Discretion? 
Introduction 
It has been demonstrated that in order for a particular law to find its ideal position on the 
rule-discretion spectrum, it must first be determined what the purpose of that law is. For 
matrimonial finance, it was determined that the overriding purpose of the law is fairness. 
However, the meaning of fairness was dissected to show that it encompasses a number of 
competing objectives—the most prominent of which are individualised justice and 
certainty. In Chapter Two, it was concluded that these should be almost evenly balanced, 
with a slight prioritising of individualised justice. This, it is argued, is because while the 
objective of certainty is fundamental in securing key elements of the law—including legal 
consistency and efficiency—the objective of individualised justice is slightly more central 
to the overriding conceptualisation of fairness in relation to financial remedy orders cases. 
Accordingly, this thesis has deduced that the ideal position on the rules-discretion 
spectrum is very close to the centre, though marginally closer to the discretion side of the 
spectrum. This is because, as Chapter Two explained, the findings from the certainty-
individualised justice debate directly reflects the position on the rule-discretion spectrum. 
In other words, a rule-based framework most effectively serves the interests of procedural 
fairness and certainty, whereas a discretionary framework is best suited for promoting 
individualised justice.363 Consequently, the next issue is whether the law on financial 
remedies in England and Wales aligns with this ideal position and, if not, whether it 
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departs from that position to such an extent that it warrants legislative reform. This will 
first be approached through an evaluation of the extent of discretion afforded by the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, with the view of determining whether this is in line with 
the ideal position. Subsequently, the impact that judicial pronouncements in the higher 
courts have had on the administration of the law will be analysed to assess whether this 
has altered the position of English and Welsh law. The following section will examine 
whether the various objectives subsumed within fairness (as discussed in Chapter Two) 
are being met, and consider whether any shortcomings are attributable to the law’s 
position on the rule-discretion spectrum or if they are caused by other factors. 
  
The Current Position of England and Wales on the Rules-Discretion Spectrum 
Section 25 of the MCA 1973 provides the guidance that governs the orders the court can 
make through the enumeration of various factors that should be taken into account. The 
Act simply requires the court when making a financial order ‘to have regard to all the 
circumstances of the case,’ as well as giving first consideration to any minor child of the 
family.364 Clearly, this provides the courts with wide discretion to decide each case ‘on 
an individual basis according to its facts.’365 With no strict rules and the lone duty for the 
courts to consider whether the financial ties between divorcing spouses should be 
terminated,366 many would accept that this statute has created an ‘exceptionally 
discretionary approach.’367 Indeed, while there is clear division regarding the benefits or 
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detriments of such discretion,368 there is widespread agreement that the jurisdiction of 
England and Wales enjoys extensive judicial discretion.369 In fact, it is uncontroversial to 
assert that the extremely wide discretion afforded to the judiciary means that the position 
of the law in England and Wales is clearly situated on the far end of the rule-discretion 
spectrum.370 Therefore, it is argued that the law as provided for by the MCA 1973 does 
not correlate with the ideal position for financial remedies law identified in Chapter Two. 
However, given the significant developments in the case law since the enactment of the 
MCA 1973, it is necessary to consider whether the development of principles from the 
Supreme Court and the Senior Courts of England and Wales has shifted the position of 
the law on the rules-discretion spectrum, and if so, by how much? 
Whilst there have been a number of significant decisions which have attempted to advance 
principle and structure since the enactment of the MCA,371 it is most pertinent to evaluate 
the seminal decisions whose principles are followed today. As has been mentioned earlier 
in this thesis, the seminal decision of White v White created the yardstick of equality and 
the central importance of non-discrimination between the husband and wife.372 White 
involved a couple who had been married for over 30 years, and had run a dairy farming 
business as a partnership. After Mrs White appealed the first instance decision and both 
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Mrs and Mrs White appealed the Court of Appeal decision, the House of Lords dismissed 
both the appeal and cross-appeal, thereby upholding the Court of Appeal judgment to 
award the wife £1.5m out of the net assets of £4.6m. However, the House of Lords 
decision departed from the Court of Appeal owing to its rationale—reaching the outcome 
on the basis of the novel ‘yardstick of equality’ and principles of fairness and non-
discrimination.373 Though this particular case resulted in an unequal division, this was due 
to Mr White’s father providing an interest free loan towards the purchase of a farm for 
their business. Accordingly, White represents a giant leap forward towards equality and 
non-discrimination, as it removed ‘the ceiling of reasonable requirements…which had 
permitted the breadwinner to retain the surplus of assets.’374 Yet, while White represented 
significant progress, there were still a number of issues left unresolved. For example, 
given the impact of the yardstick of equality, this provoked a rise in the prevalence of 
stellar contribution claims to avoid equal division. On this issue, there was obvious 
uncertainty and tension in interpretation. The Court of Appeal in Cowan v Cowan 
endorsed the legitimacy of a stellar contribution claims in justifying a departure from 
equal division where ‘a spouse exercising special skill…has gone beyond what would 
ordinarily be expected.’375 On the other hand, a year later the Court of Appeal in Lambert 
v Lambert changed its position, treating stellar contributions as a concept which should 
be used ‘only in exceptional circumstances.’376 Moreover, there remained doubt as to the 
scope of the application of the yardstick of equality with respect to matrimonial property, 
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as well as if it extended to the division of income.377 Naturally, this led to the House of 
Lords decision in Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane, for the law under White was 
clearly incomplete without this further development.378 
In Miller/McFarlane, the House of Lords held that the three guiding principles for judges 
in financial remedies cases trying to achieve fairness are: ‘the needs of the parties, 
compensation aimed at redressing any significant prospective economic disparity between 
the parties arising from the way they had conducted their marriage and equal sharing.’379 
With respect to stellar contributions, Baroness Hale maintained that this should only be 
relevant ‘if there is such a disparity in their respective contributions to the welfare of the 
family that it would be inequitable to disregard it should this be taken into account in 
determining their shares.’380 Ultimately, the two cases of White and Miller/McFarlane 
have been viewed as constructing the main pillars of matrimonial finance law, and as a 
result, Diduck contends that there has been evidence in the past two decades of courts not 
being ‘afraid to forge new policy’ in their decisions.381 Moreover, the reason for the 
courts’ insertion of principles has been, in part, to recognise the important objectives best-
served by rules. As Baroness Hale stated in Miller/McFarlane, it is important for the law 
to attain a degree of consistency and predictability ‘not only to secure that so far as 
possible like cases are treated alike but also to enable and encourage the parties to 
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negotiate their own solutions as quickly and cheaply as possible.’382 Therefore, with 
reference to the recent significant decisions in this area, they seem to reflect a shift ‘toward 
a new principled basis.’383 
However, in assessing the position of the law on the rules-discretion spectrum, it is 
important to note that these judicial decisions do not purport to espouse strict rules or even 
binding principles, but rather simply act as ‘guidelines’ or ‘relevant considerations.’384 
Naturally, the developments introduced by the courts cannot usurp Parliament’s role in 
this area of the strict wording of the statute.385 This clear limitation of the courts’ authority 
to limit the discretion in financial remedies law has been recognised by subsequent 
decisions. For example, Bodey J expressed that ‘it remains the statutory criteria which 
ultimately guide the court's overall discretion by the exercise of which fairness is sought 
to be achieved.’386 Furthermore, Sir Mark Potter P posited that an overly structured 
interpretation of the law would go ‘beyond what is required or generally appropriate in 
the exercise required of the court under s.25.’387 Accordingly, while the principles 
espoused by the House of Lords were made to clarify the rationale behind the law and, to 
an extent, structure the law to enhance the predictability of outcomes, the reluctance of 
the courts to relinquish the discretion afforded by statute has cast doubt on the effect that 
these principled judicial developments have had. 
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Despite these sentiments expressed by some members of the judiciary, it may be 
suggested that even prior to the House of Lords decisions in White and Miller/McFarlane, 
the case law provided guidance which has been understood and followed by 
practitioners.388 As a result, it has been claimed that family lawyers can ‘advise clients in 
the confident knowledge that the litigation is likely to be disposed of fairly.’389 
Furthermore, Eekelaar has noted that family lawyers, when dealing with cases involving 
young children and few assets, have been able to adopt a ‘major strategy’—meaning there 
is a degree of consistency in their approach to this type of case.390 Additionally, there have 
been subsequent judgments which have built upon the principles established in 
Miller/McFarlane in an attempt to enhance the clarity of the law. For example, in 
Charman v Charman (No 4), the Court of Appeal elucidated that the sharing principle 
was not simply a check at the end of the section 25 exercise, and implied that equality 
should be the starting point and departed from only where there is good reason.391 
Moreover, it clarified the position on stellar contributions and suggested that in limited 
circumstances—‘short’ marriages and dual career situations—unilateral assets may be not 
be included in the equal sharing principle.392 Notably, the Court did not correct counsel 
for Mr Charman in referring to this as ‘an exception to equal sharing rather than as another 
form of departure required as a matter of fairness.’393 Accordingly, it can be inferred that 
by not renouncing the sharper term of ‘exception’, the Court may in fact be demonstrating 
                                                          
388 Davis (n 300) 61. 
389 Cretney (n 20) 300. 
390 John Eekelaar, ‘Should Section 25 be Reformed?’ [1998] Family Law 469, 469. 
391 Charman (n 70) [65]. 
392 ibid [82]-[86]. 
393 Joanna Miles, ‘Charman v Charman (No 4) – making sense of need, compensation and equal sharing 
after Miller/McFarlane’ [2008] Child and Family Law Quarterly 378, 385. 
96 
 
a tendency to structure the law.394 As was analysed in Chapter One, an overly 
discretionary legal system would be problematic,395 and as such these developments by 
the judiciary to more appropriately balance rules and discretion ought to be welcomed. 
There are two points to be made in response to this claim. Firstly, while the intention of 
the courts when developing principles has been to clarify the law, this has had the effect 
of creating new conflicts regarding not only their application, but also their conceptual 
justification. For example, the rationale for the compensation principle articulated in 
McFarlane v McFarlane has been doubted.396 The principle focuses on ‘relationship-
generated disadvantage’ and aims to redress ‘any significant prospective economic 
disparity between the parties arising from the way they conducted their marriage.’397 
While subsequent cases have supported the compensation principle as an integral part of 
financial remedies,398 there has also been widespread opposition to the principle.399 Most 
prominently, Mostyn J has expressed his difficulties with the compensation principle 
owing to a number of reasons. Firstly, he asserts that it is wrong to characterise a voluntary 
decision regarding the distribution of work and home responsibilities ‘as a loss “suffered” 
by her entitling her to an award in excess of her reasonable needs.’400 Moreover, it 
                                                          
394 ibid 385. 
395 Scalia (n 134) 1178. 
396 Most prominently discussed in Miller; McFarlane (n 7). 
397 Miller; McFarlane (n 7) [13] (Lord Nicholls). 
398 Charman (n 70) [68] (Sir Mark Potter P). 
399 Rachel Chisholm, ‘Financial Remedies and Ancillary Relief’ (Thomson Reuters Westlaw 2018) [33] 
<https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/Document/I31F7458037F911E3AE60F8D0FC39500A/View
/FullText.html?navigationPath=Search%2Fv1%2Fresults%2Fnavigation%2Fi0ad604ac0000016ca66e9f4
3c71a938a%3FNav%3DRESEARCH_COMBINED_WLUK%26fragmentIdentifier%3DI31F7458037F9
11E3AE60F8D0FC39500A%26parentRank%3D0%26startIndex%3D1%26contextData%3D%2528sc.Sea
rch%2529%26transitionType%3DSearchItem&listSource=Search&listPageSource=1eb452d2fc5d354ea4
71599159f26000&list=RESEARCH_COMBINED_WLUK&rank=1&sessionScopeId=6d0a302da56b9a2
27a57279048362ef68341447ec6c76346784355da7a62f76a&originationContext=Search+Result&transitio
nType=SearchItem&contextData=%28sc.Search%29&comp=wluk> accessed 27 May 2019. 
400 SA v PA (Premarital Agreement: Compensation) [2014] EWHC 392 (F), [2014] 2 FLR 1028 [22]. 
97 
 
involves an impossible task of speculation to make an award ‘based on a guess founded 
on a vision that events that did happen, did not happen, and events that did not happen, 
did.’401 As a result, while Mostyn J is bound by the House of Lords decision, he added a 
gloss to the compensation principle such that it should only be invoked in ‘very rare and 
exceptional cases.’402 This is within his jurisdiction, as the House of Lords purposely left 
the rationale for the principles and the hierarchy of their application up to interpretation 
on a case-by-case basis, owing to ‘a fear that anything less than complete flexibility may 
produce a result which does not generate an order that is just right for this particular 
applicant.’403 Ultimately, as Sir Mark Potter P posited in Charman v Charman, where the 
principles clash or the appropriate extent of their application is uncertain, ‘the criterion of 
fairness must supply the answer.’404 This demonstrates that these principles were 
originally designed to be fluid and capable of being overridden wherever discretion so 
demands—thereby lending doubt to their effect on structuring the law. Moreover, the 
utility of the compensation principle is negligible. It has been observed that ‘arguments 
concerning the compensation principle, occasionally considered as an option by some 
interviewees, are rarely utilised or successful in the 'everyday' case.’405 Yet, this principle 
was meant to act as one of the three central principles ‘to guide post-marital 
distributions.’406 Therefore, it is contended that these principles, despite the courts’ 
intentions, do not necessarily enhance the clarity of the law in any meaningful way. This 
                                                          
401 ibid [24]. 
402 ibid [30]. 
403 Cooke (n 370) 105-106. 
404 Charman (n 70) [73]. 
405 Emma Hitchings, ‘The Impact of Recent Ancillary Relief Jurisprudence in the Everyday Ancillary 
Relief Case’ (2010) 22 Child and Family Law Quarterly 93, 96. 
406 Chan (n 341) 47. 
98 
 
shows that the current state of the law is in need of reform, as there are numerous ‘issues 
left open by the case law in ancillary relief.’407 
The second point is the obvious lack of consensus amongst members of the judiciary with 
their approach to financial remedy cases. While in some cases there is an apparent push 
for principled development, others408 reflect an ‘apparent retreat into a relatively strong, 
unstructured discretion.’409 For example, in Hvorostovsky v Hvorostovsky, Thorpe LJ 
challenged the trial judge’s exercise of discretion, arguing that though his low award could 
be justified according to the ‘generous ambit of his discretion,’ it is more accurate to 
‘conclude that the judge’s shot has failed to clip the target’s outer ring.’410 Furthermore, 
Thorpe LJ commended ‘the utility of a percentage comparison between the original order 
and the order on variation’ to provide a clearer target.411 Moreover, it has been argued by 
Mostyn J that ‘simple and fair guidance is needed so that the majority of cases can be 
settled’—a necessary quality of a healthy family justice system.412 By stark contrast and, 
dating back to the early days of the MCA 1973, Ormrod LJ opined that the legal 
framework should enable as unfettered discretion as necessary to achieve fairness in each 
individual case.413 More recently, Moylan J has built upon that sentiment and firmly 
established himself as a proponent of a flexible legal framework so as to ensure that the 
statutorily conferred discretion is preserved. In P v P, he reasoned that bright-line rules 
would have the adverse effect of encouraging parties to spend their money contesting 
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issues which fall on the borderline of rules.414 From this perspective, Moylan J’s approach 
to the law is favouring the flexibility of discretion over the certainty of rules. Notably, 
while in the Court of Appeal, he denied that there are two different schools of thought, 
and submitted that the differences in application of principles were due to the different 
circumstances of the cases.415 However, to deny the clear differences in approach is 
mistaken. As Evans argues, ‘if a case is listed before Mostyn J (and others who share that 
view, as Burton J did in S v S416) it seems more likely than not that the formulaic approach 
will follow.417 Ostensibly, there is stark dissonance amongst particular members of the 
judiciary in terms of their interpretation of the discretionary nature of the statute. 
Not only does the presence of divergent approaches exacerbate the issue of uncertainty, it 
also means these judicially developed principles can only have a limited impact on 
enhancing the role of rules in the law—thereby resulting in a negligible alteration of the 
position of the law on the rule-discretion spectrum. For judges to enhance the structure of 
the law through judicial development, there must be a collective movement from all 
members of the judiciary to harmonise their approaches to the application of the law. The 
evident disunity in judicial attitudes, therefore, weakens the potential of the principled 
development. This was evidenced when Mostyn J stated in 2012—a sufficient amount of 
time for the principles from Miller/McFarlane to settle into the law—that ‘there are not 
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even any signposts along the road to a fair award.’418 This is similar to the classic ‘bus 
driver’ analogy used to portray the extent of discretion in financial remedies law: 
‘The task of the family judge has been likened to that of…a bus driver who is 
given a large number of instructions about how to drive the bus, and the authority 
to do various actions such as turning left or right. There is also the occasional 
advice or correction offered by three senior drivers. The one piece of information 
which he or she is not given is where to take the bus. All he or she is told is that 
the driver is required to drive to a reasonable destination.’419 
This analogy—deployed by the Law Commission in 2014—indicates that the judicial 
development has been largely ineffective in curtailing the discretion afforded to the courts. 
As such, it has been recently noted that the law ‘is unsatisfactory from both the 
practitioner level of being able to offer clear advice and from the litigant level of a clear 
understanding of the principles to be applied with a view to reaching an early and cost 
economic compromise.’420 Ultimately, it argued that the overriding perspective of the 
judiciary is that determining a financial provision remains ‘more of an art than a science, 
given the width of the discretion expressly given to the court by Parliament.’421 
Furthermore, Coleridge J opined that ‘there is almost no guidance or authority in relation 
to the way in which the court should determine this aspect of an ancillary relief claim.’422 
The fact that this is the position of a member of the judiciary is certainly concerning, as it 
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raises doubt in relation to law’s ability to attain its core objectives, including legal 
consistency and judicial accountability. As Francis rightly commented, ‘if such an 
experienced judge of the Family Division feels that he has almost no guidance, where do 
the rest of us stand?’423 Accordingly, while the courts may develop principles in a 
piecemeal fashion as is common in other areas of law, this has not significantly enhanced 
the role of rules in the legal framework for the purpose of substantially shifting the 
position of the law on the rule-discretion spectrum. Therefore, it may be concluded that 
the law on financial remedies in England and Wales is far too discretionary and fails to 
match the ideal position. 
 
Are the Objectives being met nonetheless? 
While it has been established that the law on financial remedies in England and Wales is 
not ideally positioned on the rules-discretion spectrum, it is worth considering whether 
the objectives of the law subsumed within fairness (as discussed in Chapter 2) are being 
satisfied nonetheless. One of these objectives, identified in Chapter Two, is individualised 
justice. Naturally, it is nearly impossible to determine whether individualised justice has 
been realised in a given case, let alone within the family justice system as a whole. 
Substantive fairness under the discretionary framework of the Matrimonial Causes Act 
1973 is, fundamentally, a judgement call which is both ‘instinctive and intuitive.’424 Put 
simply, it is an immeasurable concept. Given the limited scope of this thesis and the 
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challenges of obtaining representative evidence of the ‘everyday’ cases rather than the 
reported ‘big money’ cases, the efficacy of the current law in attaining substantively fair 
outcomes will not be examined.425 What can be demonstrated is that the courts are already 
striving to achieve this objective, and therefore, there is no need for ‘any change in 
direction for the courts.’426 Many of the key elements of substantive fairness appear to be 
followed in the reported cases. In relation to the equal sharing principle, there is evidence 
to point to it being respected and utilised as a tool to attain substantive fairness. For 
example, in MAP v MFP, the wife was awarded half of the total assets valued at roughly 
£24M. In his judgment, Moor J justified this award because the contributions of the 
husband and wife were equal and, therefore, ‘the fruits of the marriage are to be divided 
equally.’427 In this way, the outcome of this case aligned with the spirit of White and the 
application of both the equal sharing and non-discrimination principles. Accordingly, 
while this thesis cannot conclude with absolute certainty that substantive fairness is being 
achieved in the everyday cases in England and Wales, it will nonetheless assume that this 
objective is being fulfilled under the present law. 
Next, it is necessary to consider the objective of legal certainty and consistency. As 
previously discussed in Chapter 2, the Irish legal system suffers from ‘forum shopping’, 
whereby parties seek an advantage by targeting a particular regional court with a 
reputation for favouring certain factors in divorce cases.428 The Law Commission for 
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England and Wales has concluded that this is also occurring in its jurisdiction. It states 
that ‘there is evidence of significant differences in the way the law is applied, both 
between individual judges and between different areas of the country,’ and as a result, it 
is concerning for the legal system with respect to inconsistencies and forum shopping.429 
A specific example provided in the report was the policy-based approach by the courts on 
providing either a joint lives or term order. It was discovered that while ‘the Principal 
Registry of the Family Division and High Court tend to make joint lives orders, other 
major court centres do not.’430 However, it should be noted that variation is inevitable 
given the fact-specific nature of financial remedies in divorce. As Lord Hoffman posited, 
‘judges are also people, this means that some degree of diversity in their application of 
values is inevitable and, within limits, an acceptable price to pay for the flexibility of the 
discretion conferred by the Act of 1973.’431 Nonetheless, these inconsistencies become 
especially problematic when they can be attributed to geographical location.432 
Accordingly, the Law Commission concluded that given the substantial ‘evidence of 
regional inconsistency, and of its being used strategically by legal advisers…[it should be 
regarded] as problematic.’433 
However, this harmful effect may be mitigated by the prevalence of private negotiations 
out of court. As Davis et al state, the financial remedies system is ‘fundamentally a 
negotiation system,’ which is often conducted by the parties and their legal representatives 
rather than a judge.434 Therefore, if the participants are able to follow a clear and 
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comprehensible legal framework to reach fair outcomes, the impact of forum shopping 
may ultimately be limited. In a 2009 publication, it was contended that ‘there is a [largely] 
consistent approach amongst practitioners in dealing with the everyday ancillary relief 
case.’435 While it was noted that there was nonetheless still a ‘preference amongst certain 
practitioners for dealing with particular courts,’436 this is not especially relevant for the 
many cases which settle out of court. Furthermore, it has been well-documented that 
parties struggle to receive any clear advice pertaining to the predictability of outcome.437 
In a study of parties to divorce proceedings, it was found that the ‘prevailing 
impression…was that their solicitors were too vague in the advice they gave and too 
uncertain in their predictions.’438 Under the MCA 1973, this hesitation to provide 
straightforward advice with respect to court or negotiation outcomes will likely not 
change.439 As discussed above, the case law has attempted to structure and enhance the 
certainty of the law, yet it is a process which remains (without much hope for substantial 
change) incomplete.440 Given the issues analysed in Chapter Two regarding the imbalance 
of bargaining power and the rise in the number of litigants in person, a legal system 
lacking clarity and certainty is likely to lead to injustice in the negotiation process. Thus, 
not only is the law in England and Wales failing in terms of legal consistency and the 
incidental effect of forum shopping, the negotiation alternative to the court process is 
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being conducted in an environment which is not well-suited to protect the interests of the 
most vulnerable in society. 
Lastly, with respect to the efficiency of the judicial process, it has been established that 
financial remedy or so-called ‘money-cases’ are the primary ‘type’ of family law case 
which suffers from delayed or prolonged hearings. A study published by the Ministry of 
Justice concluded the following: 
‘Longer or additional hearings needed as LIPs (litigants in person) were unable to 
understand what they needed to do either preparing for or during hearings. LIPs 
may have made major errors in preparation or failed to complete tasks essential 
for case progression e.g. filing of Form E. LIPs were unable to present their case 
effectively, e.g. incapable of grasping how to cross-examine. Judges provided 
some limited verbal explanations of the process but not enough to enable the LIP 
to participate effectively.’441 
In essence, it was found that in cases involving an application for a financial order, the 
court process suffered from inefficient and longer hearings, as well as the possibility for 
unfair outcomes where a party did not have representation.442 Moreover, in 2018, Sir 
James Munby laid out as one of his core ambitions as President of the Family Division 
for financial remedies law ‘to improve significantly…the application of procedural 
justice.’443 As part of his plan, he specifically mentions that the law must address the 
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issues of efficiency and consistency. Accordingly, it may be concluded with a high degree 
of certitude that the current legal system does not optimally meet its objective to handle 
financial remedies cases efficiently. 
 
Other Contributing Factors to the Deficiencies in the Law 
It has been clearly shown that many of the objectives subsumed within fairness are not 
being realised adequately under the present law. The law continues to persist in a state of 
uncertainty and remains prone to inefficiencies and conflict.444 However, before delving 
into possible proposals for reform in Chapter Four, it is necessary to consider whether 
these deficiencies are solely attributable to the discretionary nature of the legal 
framework, or if there are any other contributing factors. Undeniably, the legal aid cuts 
since the LASPOA 2012445 have had seriously damaging effects on the family justice 
system. The significant delays and procedural difficulties in family courts have been often 
linked to the lack of funding and the increasing number of parties who must be self-
represented.446 Clearly, this unfortunate state of legal aid and access to justice contributes 
to the difficulties the law on financial remedies faces in attaining its objectives. However, 
it is submitted that even if this were to improve (for which at present there is no guarantee), 
the root of the issue would remain. Whilst litigants in person certainly impact upon the 
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efficiency of the judicial process,447 the challenges the law faces with respect to 
procedural fairness are inherent to an extremely discretionary legal system—as argued in 
Chapter Two. 
A different factor which may be presenting difficulties to obtaining the various objectives 
is the lack of specialist ‘family finance’ judges. In more recent academic literature, it has 
been noted that money cases have not been regarded as a ‘specialist discipline.’448 The 
consequence of this is that ‘any deputy district judge (DDJ) or district judge can be 
expected to take on a money case load with little or no experience and no specialist 
training.’449 The logical solution—which has been proposed and implemented in the 
Central Family Court in London—is to establish specialist ‘Financial Remedies Units 
around England and Wales.’450 The benefits of such a model, it has been argued, are 
‘greater efficiencies in the administrative process…greater efficiencies in the judicial 
process…[and the] promotion of more consistency in the judicial approach to money 
cases.’451 This, of course, is a factor separate from the rules-discretion spectrum debate 
and is a welcomed change. In fact, it has been noted that a pilot conducted in Birmingham 
one year ago has shown nothing but positive signs.452 However, while the introduction of 
specialist courts to hear financial remedies proceedings will certainly have profound 
impacts on the attainability of the relevant objectives, the challenges in achieving 
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consistency and legal certainty will remain. As discussed above, even expert family law 
judges and practitioners disagree on fundamental issues in the law, and the variance in the 
application and approach to the law will likely remain—even if reduced by the Financial 
Remedies Unit reform proposal. Accordingly, while there are other relevant factors which 
influence the attainment of the objectives of financial remedies law, they do not outweigh 
or diminish the primary role which the discretionary nature of the law plays in 
contributing to these deficiencies. 
 
Conclusions 
This Chapter has demonstrated that the law on financial remedies in England and Wales 
does not align with the ideal position on the rule-discretion spectrum. While the ideal 
position is near the middle, the English and Welsh law reflects an unduly discretionary 
approach at the far end of the spectrum. Furthermore, it has been argued that many of the 
core objectives which financial remedies law is designed to achieve are not currently 
being fulfilled. While there are other factors which may either positively or negatively 
affect the attainment of these objectives, it is plain that the discretionary nature of the 
legal framework is primarily responsible for these shortcomings. In short, it can be 
concluded that reform is needed for two reasons: to correct the position of the law on the 
rule-discretion spectrum and to increase the propensity of fulfilling the substantive and 
procedural fairness objectives of the law. 
In turning this thesis’ attention to reform, it is imperative to clarify the most effective 
method by which this should occur. Plainly, it is essential for reform to come from 
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Parliament. The current state of the law under the MCA 1973 is framed in a way which is 
far too discretionary for any significant restructuring to emerge from the judiciary. As has 
been demonstrated above, when senior judges develop principles in key cases, they must 
qualify their judgments with an acknowledgement that their pronouncements are not 
binding rules, but merely guidance. For example, Lord Nicholls made sure to clarify that 
‘the yardstick of equality is to be applied as an aid, not a rule.’453 If the judiciary were to 
lay down a rule to enhance the certainty of the application of the law, it would usurp the 
legislature.454 Without parliamentary reform, the discretion conferred by the current 
statute will always prevail. Therefore, reform to reposition the law on the rule-discretion 
spectrum and to more effectively achieve the objectives of financial remedies law must 
come in the form of new legislation from Parliament. Accordingly, Chapter Four will 
propose a model which could be adopted by the legislature. 
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Chapter Four: The Way Forward 
Introduction 
In Chapter Two, it was argued that the ideal position on the rule-discretion spectrum for 
financial remedies law is near the middle, with a marginal prioritisation of discretion. This 
was concluded to be the optimal position because it would reflect the view that 
individualised justice should be slightly favoured over certainty—a standpoint which was 
justified on the basis that it most accurately appreciates the relationship between the 
various objectives of the legal framework subsumed within the overarching pursuit of 
fairness. It was then demonstrated in Chapter Three that the law in England and Wales is 
on the extreme-discretionary end of the spectrum, and therefore clearly fails to match the 
ideal position. As a result, it was concluded that legislative reform should be pursued in 
order to enhance the law’s capability of achieving its primary objectives. Accordingly, 
the purpose of this Chapter is to propose the way forward for financial remedies law. In 
particular, this proposal will be aiming to translate the ideal position described in Chapter 
Two from theoretical to practical terms. Put simply, this Chapter will seek to create a 
model which could be described as ‘near the middle of the rule-discretion spectrum, with 
a marginal prioritisation of discretion.’ In approaching this undertaking, there will be a 
thorough discussion of this thesis’ proposal for reform, which will involve justifying each 
of its components, explaining how it would be implemented and integrated within the 
existing legal framework, and demonstrating how it would be applied in practice through 
the use of both actual and hypothetical case examples. As a part of this analysis, this 
Chapter will evaluate the challenges that this thesis’ proposal for reform might face, and 
discern whether it would be well received by the legal community. However, it is first 
111 
 
important to discuss the current reform proposals being examined by Parliament and 
family lawyers, and consider whether such models should be adopted. 
 
The Current Climate for Reform 
It is undeniable that there is a growing movement amongst judges and practitioners for 
‘the modernisation of the statutory approach to the financial division of assets on 
divorce.’455 One of the main issues, therefore, is how such reform should be constructed. 
Whilst there has been a great deal of discussion regarding legal reform, the most 
prominent (and current) proposal has come from Baroness Deech with her Divorce 
(Financial Provision) Bill [HL].456 In this Bill, she lays out three key issues: matrimonial 
property, periodical payments, and prenuptial and postnuptial agreements.457 With respect 
to matrimonial property, the Bill lays out as a general rule that its net value should be 
shared fairly, which, save for a few prescribed situations,458 means an equal division.459 It 
would, therefore, exclude non-matrimonial property—such as premarital assets, 
inheritances and gifts—from sharing.460 Furthermore, the most notable part of the 
periodical payments provision is the limitation of payments to no more than five years, 
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‘unless the court is satisfied that there is no other means of making provision for a party 
to the marriage and that that party would otherwise be likely to suffer serious financial 
hardship as a result.’461 Finally, the Bill sets out that prenuptial and postnuptial agreements 
shall be binding except where a prescribed procedural condition is not met.462 As Baroness 
Deech expressed in her speech for the Second Reading of the Bill in the House of Lords, 
part of the justification for this proposal is to correct the failure of the Matrimonial Causes 
Act 1973 to satisfy the requirements of the rule of law to ‘be accessible, intelligible, clear 
and predictable.’463 This aspect of the Bill is to be welcomed, as it seeks the noble 
objective of ameliorating the state of legal certainty and procedural fairness. Of course, it 
is imperative that the pursuit of this aim takes a sensible approach with the view of 
reaching the ideal balance of rules and discretion. The rigidity of this Bill has been 
criticised by many, including Lord Wilson who states that it would have ‘grotesque 
consequences’ if applied in practice.464 Most notably, Lady Hale has publicly criticised 
the Bill for its ‘one size fits all’ approach, doubting whether it could conceivably satisfy 
the interests of fairness and justice in cases.465 The appropriate extent of structure and 
flexibility is, therefore, a naturally contentious issue bearing a number of different 
perspectives. 
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Yet, the most controversial element of this Bill is its impact on women and the 
mischaracterisation of gender roles in marriage.466 It is Deech’s view that her Bill, through 
the limitations on equal sharing and periodical payments, will enable women to lead 
independent and economically prosperous lives. This is because, she contends, ‘extreme 
handouts to divorced wives do nothing to help unmarried women and single mothers who 
are making their own way in the workplace.’467 Furthermore, she argues that a law which 
allows divorced wives to be dependent on their former partner removes the individual 
responsibility and autonomy of women, and consequently serves as ‘a very serious 
impediment to equality.’468 However, while there is some merit to the notion that divorced 
wives must (and usually do) assume a significant share of the responsibility for the 
financial aspect of their lives, there are other crucial factors which are not considered—
thereby making it an incomplete depiction of the challenges women face post-divorce. 
For example, economic research studies have shown that women re-entering the 
workforce after caring for their children face significant disadvantages, including lower 
earnings, difficulty retaining the same position in a company, and barriers to promotion.469 
This leads Thompson to correctly note that the only women Deech’s Bill helps are those 
with ‘privileged irresponsibility,’470 meaning members of the upper and middle class who 
are sufficiently affluent to seamlessly transition into the workforce without adversely 
                                                          
466 For more discussion on the gendered element of the Deech Bill, see Thompson Written Evidence (n 
345). 
467 HL Deb (n 460) cols 375-376. 
468 Patrick Sawyer, ‘Divorces are Skewed by Judges’ Outdated Chivalry, says Female Peer Pushing for 
Cap on Payments’ (The Telegraph 2017) <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/12/divorces-
skewed-judges-antiquated-chivalry-says-female-peer/> accessed 20 June 2019. 
469 Shoba Arun, Thankom Arun and Vani Borooah, ‘The effect of career breaks on the working lives of 
women’ (2004) 10 Feminist Economics 65, 80. 
470 Term originating from: Joan Tronto, Caring Democracy: Markets, Equality and Justice (New York 
University Press 2013) 60. 
114 
 
affecting their responsibilities at home. With rises in childcare costs, as well as the 
additional challenges women face in re-entering the workforce, it becomes plain that this 
element of Deech’s justification for the Bill represents a gross mischaracterisation of the 
experience of most divorced wives.471 
Furthermore, Deech mentions that London is considered the ‘divorce capital of the world’ 
because ‘the wives of wealthy men come to London from all over the world for a generous 
settlement.’472 The terms ‘gold digger’ or ‘alimony drone’ have been coined to represent 
these women who seek a big pay-out.473 It is suggested that the Deech Bill, through its 
binding enforcement of prenuptial and postnuptial agreement, is able to effectively 
eradicate the prominence of gold diggers by protecting the assets of wealthy men. While 
the subject of gold diggers and its effect on the public perception of divorce law is far too 
large for this thesis to delve into in much detail, it is worth raising an important point.474 
The inclusion (and overstatement) of gold digging as part of the justification for binding 
prenuptial agreements has the harmful effect of overshadowing the most relevant and 
important considerations which must be taken with respect to this issue. In the ordinary 
case, a serious concern is the role of bargaining power and undue influence when reaching 
marital agreements. As the Law Commission noted as a point of caution, ‘a spouse may 
agree to something for the sake of peace, particularly if it has no immediate effect.’475 
Moreover, in the unique context of family relationships, agreeing to a financial settlement 
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before a number of (potentially) unforeseeable significant changes in circumstances will 
likely render the agreement unjust.476 Ultimately, these agreements have a largely 
‘androcentric effect on divorce whereby masculine values take precedence and inevitably 
advantage men.’477 With a focus on gold diggers as being the primary justification for 
binding prenuptial agreements, it ‘often overshadows these inequalities.’478 As a result, it 
is clear that the Deech Bill is vulnerable to criticism and should not be pursued as the ideal 
model for reform of financial remedies law. Therefore, it is submitted that an alternative 
model for reform must be explored—the focus for the remainder of this Chapter. 
Presently, however, the Deech Bill has progressed through the House of Lords and is due 
to have its second reading in the House of Commons. Evidently, if it receives approval 
from the House of Commons, it will have a serious impact on the law on financial 
remedies. 
 
Reform Proposal: The Fail-Safe Model 
Before delving into the core of this thesis’ model for reform, it is first necessary to present 
the opening section of the proposal. In the interests of transparency and clarity, it is the 
position of this thesis that the statute should include a provision which expressly states 
that the objective of the law is fairness, whilst also including a list of some of the factors 
which make an outcome both substantively and procedurally fair. This may take the 
following form: 
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1. Overriding Objective 
(1) The overriding objective of the sections of this statute governing the law relating 
to financial remedy orders shall be to achieve fairness between the parties. 
(2) In pursuing the objective of fairness, the courts shall in particular have regard to 
the principles of substantive equality, non-discrimination, and legal consistency. 
This is not novel to family law, as The Family Procedure Rules 2010 includes a section 
with the ‘overriding objective’ of those rules and some examples of how its objective ‘of 
enabling the court to deal with cases justly’ can be satisfied.479 Crucially, the inclusion of 
Section 1(2) serves to expressly lay down the fundamental guiding principles. While this 
non-exhaustive list is not prescriptive, it is intended to facilitate judicially developed 
principles to be rooted in statute, rather than case law. This not only enhances the clarity 
of the law for practitioners and judges, it also makes the law more accessible and easier 
for a layperson to understand. Accordingly, the inclusion of an express objective would 
result in a statutory law which is both clearer and more intelligible than the present system. 
In searching for a model of reform which reflects a middle or balanced position on the 
rule-discretion spectrum, this thesis is proposing the ‘fail-safe model’.480 To reduce it to 
its core elements, the fail-safe model is a law which represents the following structure: 
RULE             THRESHOLD             DISCRETION 
Firstly, there would be a legal rule which ought to be followed. However, this rule would 
not have absolute application. Rather, it could be departed from if the particular case 
meets the relevant threshold. If the threshold is satisfied, then the legal issue is to be 
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resolved through the use of judicial discretion, taking into account the relevant legal rules, 
principles and standards.481 In essence, if the legal rule would lead to an unfair outcome 
for either party to financial remedies proceedings, the availability of discretion to decide 
a particular issue on its facts acts as the fail-safe to the general law.482 Naturally, the 
crucial aspect of this model is how the threshold is defined. If it is set to a low standard, 
rather than discretion acting as a fail-safe, it would be so easily accessible that it would 
likely be a normal or expected part of proceedings. Conversely, if the standard for the 
threshold were to be set overly high, there would be a high number of cases which would 
benefit from the exercise of judicial discretion yet would not meet the requisite criterion—
thereby resulting in undesirable consequences for the law’s pursuit of individualised 
justice. As was demonstrated in the preceding Chapters of this thesis, the ideal balance of 
rules and discretion in the law varies depending on a particular law’s purpose. Therefore, 
while this fail-safe model could have a general application, its threshold must be 
specifically designed to most accurately reflect the appropriate balance of rules and 
discretion for the law on financial remedies: a nearly centred position on the spectrum. 
a) Financial remedies example 
In revealing the threshold that would be assigned to the fail-safe model for financial 
remedies law, it is clearest if it is demonstrated through an example. Given its prominence 
in debates and case law surrounding this area of law, the issue of how matrimonial 
                                                          
481 Legal rules, principles and standards as interpreted by Dworkin (which was explored in greater detail 
in Chapter One): Dworkin Model (n 78) 23-27. 
482 Naturally, if the issue of determining whether an outcome would be unfair arose in court, the judge 
would be reach a judgement on this matter. However, in the context of out of court settlements, it would 
be a matter for the parties (or, if applicable, their legal representation) to navigate the threshold of 
unfairness according to the statutory guidance and the standard approach of the courts—a phenomenon 
which would require a few years to develop. 
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property should be divided will be used as the example. Importantly, it is worth noting 
that this thesis is not planning on reformulating all provisions in the MCA that relate to 
the division of assets. Rather, the following matrimonial property provision is an 
illustrative example that, if accepted, could be used as the basis for applying the fail-safe 
model to other areas of matrimonial finance. To recall, the model consists of a rule, a 
threshold, and judicial discretion. The law governing matrimonial property would be the 
following: 
2. Matrimonial Property 
(1) Matrimonial property483 shall be shared equally between the parties to the marriage 
unless it would result in an unfair outcome to either party. 
(2) When deciding whether an outcome would be unfair for the purposes of section 1(1), 
the first consideration is ‘the welfare while a minor of any child of the family who has 
not attained the age of eighteen.’484 
(3) When deciding whether equal division of matrimonial property would result in 
unfairness, the court shall in particular have regard to: 
a. the income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources which each 
of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future, 
including in the case of earning capacity any increase in that capacity which it 
would in the opinion of the court be reasonable to expect a party to the marriage 
to take steps to acquire; 
                                                          
483 The meaning of which will be discussed in greater detail below. 
484 MCA (n 2) s 25(1). 
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b. the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which each of the parties to 
the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future; 
c. the standard of living enjoyed by the family before the breakdown of the marriage; 
d. the age of each party to the marriage and the duration of the marriage; 
e. any physical or mental disability of either of the parties to the marriage; 
f. the contributions which each of the parties has made or is likely in the foreseeable 
future to make to the welfare of the family, including any contribution by looking 
after the home or caring for the family; 
g. the conduct of each of the parties, if that conduct is such that it would in the 
opinion of the court be inequitable to disregard it; 
h. in the case of proceedings for divorce or nullity of marriage, the value to each of 
the parties to the marriage of any benefit…which, by reason of the dissolution or 
annulment of the marriage, that party will lose the chance of acquiring.’485 
Before delving into each aspect of this proposal, there are a few matters to clarify from 
the outset. Firstly, it is evident that the threshold includes, almost verbatim, the current 
Section 25 factors under the MCA 1973. However, it is worth observing that this 
matrimonial property section utilises the factors differently from the MCA. The current 
use of Section 25 is for a court to use when making an award, whereas this proposal uses 
the factors to determine whether something is unfair in the first place.  This, of course, is 
intentional, and will be explained shortly. Additionally, while the matrimonial property 
section is heavily influenced by Section 25, it has omitted the ‘all the circumstances of 
                                                          
485 MCA (n 2) s 25(2). 
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the case’ aspect of that MCA provision. This is because not only is it unnecessary,486 but 
to retain that element would be overly discretionary. In terms of the structure of this 
example, it is worth clarifying each component of the matrimonial property provision and 
how it fits with the fail-safe model. Drawing upon the findings of Chapter One, the rule 
element of this provision is that ‘matrimonial property is to be shared equally between the 
parties to the marriage.’ Naturally, the term ‘matrimonial property’ is far from 
straightforward, and as such this presents an issue which this proposal will address in the 
‘justification’ section of this chapter. The threshold aspect of this provision is ‘unless it 
would result in an unfair outcome to either party,’ coupled with a sub-section which 
provides guidance for a court when deciding whether an outcome would be unfair. Lastly, 
the discretion component is introduced where the threshold of unfairness has been 
satisfied, thereby empowering the court to reach a decision on the particular issue (in this 
case, it is the division of matrimonial property) by exercising their discretion in light of 
the relevant statutory framework and jurisprudence. This leads to the matter of how this 
proposal would fit within the existing legal framework. 
b) Implementation 
When discussing how this proposal would be implemented, there are a number of different 
considerations which must be addressed. For the purposes of this thesis, it is clearest to 
separate these into two categories: the statute and the case law. With respect to the former, 
it is necessary to consider the effect that this proposal would have on the current primary 
statute: the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. While the fail-safe model can be applied to a 
                                                          
486 Given that the statute was enacted nearly 50 years ago, judges are familiar with Section 25, and 
therefore they already know to approach financial remedy cases holistically. Lord Nicholls in Miller; 
McFarlane (n 7) [22]: ‘The statute requires the court to have regard to all the circumstances of the case.’ 
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number of different issues currently covered under the MCA, it is the position of this 
thesis that the MCA should not be repealed or replaced,487 but rather amended to include 
the relevant changes and remove certain aspects which would be made redundant. 
Moreover, given that Part II of the MCA is the main branch of the statute which governs 
financial relief, there is no need to replace the entire statute which covers other aspects of 
matrimonial law.488 Given the scope of this thesis, it is not possible to specify and justify 
whether each individual provision within Part II would be affected, nor how it would be 
changed. However, what can be assured is that Section 25 would be repealed, as its overly 
flexible nature would contravene the purpose of this reform—principally because it fails 
to operate within the fail-safe model. That being said, many of the principles within 
Section 25 would be retained through its application in the threshold element of some 
provisions (for example, the matrimonial property provision). 
In relation to the case law and the principles created therein, they would play a significant 
role in the development of this proposal insofar as it pertains to the drafting of the specific 
provisions and the definitions of key terms within the statute. Given the limited direction 
provided by the current MCA 1973, the development of policy and the parameters for 
whether a rule would be considered unfair would largely be influenced by the case law. 
For example, the provision on matrimonial property—whereby such property is to be 
shared equally unless it would result in unfairness—is a reflection of the generally 
accepted equal sharing principle developed by the judiciary in White and 
                                                          
487 Cf Coleridge J arguing to repeal the MCA 1973: Paul Coleridge, ‘Lobbing a few pebbles in the pond: 
the funeral of a dead parrot’ [2014] Family Law 168. 
488 Whereas Part I covers ‘Divorce, Nullity and Other Matrimonial Suits’ and Part III covers Protection, 
Custody, Etc., of Children. Notably, if the Divorce Bill (n 1) passes, then Part I is likely to be 
fundamentally reformed so as to enable pure no-fault divorce. 
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Miller/McFarlane. To refer to the components of the fail-safe model, the rule of this 
provision reflects the judicially approved view that when a marriage ends, the parties are 
entitled to an equal share of the fruits of the partnership.489 Further, the threshold reflects 
the view that such equality may be departed from where ‘there is good reason for doing 
so.’490 Therefore, the discretion is engaged to reach an outcome which is fair to both 
parties of the marriage.491 Consequently, the case law remains relevant and is reflected in 
the statute in a more transparent and comprehensible manner. By incorporating many of 
the principles of the case law into the statute, it is intended that this will carefully maintain 
their objectives for individualised justice while also establishing a much-needed degree 
of certainty to their application. It follows, therefore, that the following section will 
discuss the way in which this proposal promotes many of the core objectives of fairness 
and the justifications for the various elements of this model. 
c) Justifications 
This section will be divided into four main discussions. It will explain the reasoning 
behind each of the three components of the fail-safe model and why it has been formulated 
in such a way. It will then analyse the proposal as a whole to determine its potential impact 
on a number of crucial issues for matrimonial finance law. It will ultimately reveal that 
                                                          
489 Miller; McFarlane (n 7) [20]. However, a crucial difference exists between the judicially developed 
‘equal sharing principle’ and the fail-safe model. While Lord Nicholls White envisaged equal division to 
act as a ‘yardstick’ for the division of assets, this thesis proposes a model for reform which automatically 
applies equal division of matrimonial property (which can subsequently be departed from). 
490 White (n 8) [25]. 
491 See, for example, Sharp v Sharp [2017] EWCA Civ 408, [2018] 2 WLR 1617 (summary of judgment): 
‘where there had been a short, childless marriage with dual incomes and where only some of their 
finances had been pooled, the need to achieve overall fairness between the parties might require a 
departure from the sharing principle (which would otherwise require matrimonial assets to be shared 
equally) or the exclusion of some property from the calculation, notwithstanding that parties had not 
entered into a pre-nuptial agreement expressly opting out of the sharing concept.’ 
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the combination of the three components of the fail-safe model would, from a holistic 
perspective, improve the state of the law relating to financial remedy orders by creating a 
more balanced framework for the application of both rules and discretion. 
i) The rule component 
To begin, the rule element of this proposal is designed to enhance the structure and 
certainty of the law. Self-evidently, it promotes the rules side of the spectrum, which is 
almost non-existent in the current statute and certainly even more absent in the case law. 
By providing a general rule, it serves as a benchmark for lawyers and the parties to gauge 
what would be a fair settlement to agree upon. However, as it was noted earlier in this 
chapter, a rule may contain one or more terms which are subject to interpretation—thereby 
weakening the effect that such a rule could have on the certainty of the law. To refer to 
the earlier example of the ‘Matrimonial Property’ provision, the meaning of the term 
‘matrimonial property’ is contentious and presents a challenge to the strength of that 
particular provision.492 The way this proposal addresses this issue is similar to its approach 
for the primary provisions: apply the fail-safe model to reflect the balance which has been 
argued to be ideal for financial remedies law. This would mean that the key terms would 
be given a specific statutory definition,493 which can be departed from if the factual pattern 
meets the relevant threshold (unfairness), and consequently it would be decided by the 
exercise of judicial discretion. For the sake of clarity, the specific model for the definition 
of matrimonial property would be the following: 
                                                          
492 See, for example, the dissonance between Lord Nicholls and Baroness Hale on the meaning of 
matrimonial property in Miller; McFarlane (n 7). 
493 Though naturally, judicial development means that these terms could be gradually modified over time. 
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 In Section 2(1) ‘Matrimonial Property’ of this proposal— 
‘Matrimonial property’ means the matrimonial home plus any property—
excluding gifts or inheritance—acquired by either party during the marriage. 
From the outset, it is worth evaluating the fact that the chosen definition also reflects the 
positively received Scottish law. The Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 provides a positive 
definition, which considers matrimonial property as: 
‘[A]ll the property belonging to the parties or either of them at the relevant date 
which was acquired by them or him (otherwise than by way of gift or succession 
from a third party)—(a) before the marriage for use by them as a family home or 
as furniture or plenishings for such home; or (b) during the marriage but before 
the relevant date.’494 
The strong and robust nature of this provision—when coupled with the statutory 
presumption of equal division—has been commended for its positive impact by offering 
predictable results without compromising the attainment of substantive fairness.495 
However, as Thompson cautions, the Scottish experience should not be blindly relied 
upon, as the legal culture is very different from that of the English and Welsh jurisdiction. 
Indeed, it has been found that Scotland enjoys a ‘settlement-friendly environment’; in part 
due to the country’s civil law structure and its firmly established ‘use of marriage-related 
contracts.’496 Nonetheless, given the high praise and overwhelmingly positive reviews 
                                                          
494 Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985, s 10(4). 
495 Crowley (n 162) 394. 
496 Jane Mair, Fran Wasoff and Kirsteen Mackay, All Settled? A Study of Legally Binding Separation 
Agreements and Private Ordering in Scotland: Final Report (Centre for Research on Families and 
Relationships 2013) 16. 
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from ‘solicitors, advocates, sheriffs and judges’ alike,497 there is certainly value in 
considering the potential benefits of adopting specific aspects of their legislation. 
Therefore, while the alignment of this thesis’ definition of matrimonial property with that 
of the Scottish legislation is not necessarily evidence that it should be adopted, this 
overlap may be said to assist the case of this thesis. 
Further support for this proposal can be found in the fact that, while there is judicial 
disagreement regarding the precise meaning of matrimonial property, this thesis’ chosen 
definition aligns with the essence of the leading judgments on this particular issue. In 
Charman, Sir Mark Potter P equated matrimonial property to ‘the property of the parties 
generated during the marriage otherwise than by external donation.’498 Most prominently, 
Lord Nicholls and Baroness Hale discussed their respective interpretations of the meaning 
of matrimonial and non-matrimonial property in Miller/McFarlane. For Lord Nicholls, 
he viewed marital property as all property other than ‘property which the parties bring 
with them into the marriage or acquire by inheritance or gift during the marriage (plus 
perhaps the income or fruits of that property).’499 By contrast, Baroness Hale defined the 
same as all property other than ‘(a) property which the parties bring with them into the 
marriage or acquire by inheritance or gift during the marriage (plus perhaps its income or 
fruits)…[and] (b) business or investment assets generated solely or mainly by the efforts 
of one party during the marriage.’500 Evidently, the definition selected for this proposal 
for reform more closely reflects Lord Nicholls’ perspective, particularly because it omits 
                                                          
497 Jane Mair, Enid Mordaunt and Fran Wasoff, Built to Last: The Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 – 30 
Years of Financial Provision on Divorce (Nuffield 2016) 172-173. 
498 Charman (n 70) [66]. 
499 As neatly summarised by Lord Mance in Miller; McFarlane (n 7) [167]. 
500 ibid [168] (Lord Mance). 
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the latter half of Hale’s position. However, though the difference is notable, Baroness 
Hale acknowledges that it will be ‘irrelevant in the great majority of cases.’501 
Furthermore, Hale’s interpretation of the ‘business or investment assets’ which may be 
considered non-matrimonial property is fairly limited. Indeed, it would mainly apply in 
the case of a short marriage, ‘the timing of which may or may not coincide with a period 
of significant increase in the value of non-business-partnership.’502 Yet, given that the 
main rationale for this perspective of matrimonial property is to ensure that there is 
flexibility to depart from equal sharing,503 it is submitted that the opportunity to depart 
from the general rule in Section 2(1) preserves that interest. For example, if a case 
involves a short marriage with one party accruing significant sums of money in a short 
period of time during the marriage (from, for example, stock investments which are prone 
to erratic windfalls or shortfalls), the relevant party may submit that equal sharing of 
matrimonial property—as defined by the statute—would result in unfairness. 
Consequently, the court (or solicitors during private negotiations) could adjust the 
division of matrimonial property to reflect the appropriate departure from equality—
thereby accommodating the intentions of Baroness Hale’s definition. Essentially, given 
the application of the fail-safe model, the opportunity to depart from equal division of 
matrimonial property (where the ‘unfairness’ threshold of Section 2(1) would be satisfied) 
ensures that a prescriptive definition of matrimonial property does not preclude 
individuals from retaining independently obtained property which would ordinarily be 
                                                          
501 ibid [152]. 
502 ibid [169] (Lord Mance). 
503 ibid [153] (Baroness Hale): ‘This is simply to recognise that in a matrimonial property regime which 
still starts with the premise of separate property, there is still some scope for one party to acquire and 
retain separate property which is not automatically to be shared equally between them.’ 
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shared equally between the parties due to its classification as ‘matrimonial’. Accordingly, 
while there will always be disagreement with any prescribed interpretation of matrimonial 
property, the chosen definition is one which can be said to be widely accepted, as it 
broadly captures a range of descriptions of matrimonial property.504 
ii) The threshold component 
This leads to the justification for the threshold of the primary provision. It was 
demonstrated through the example of the matrimonial property provision that the 
threshold for discretion would be if the application of the rule would lead to an unfair 
outcome, and that this is to be decided with reference to the Section 2(2)-(3) factors.505 
Firstly, by including the lower (and more flexible) threshold of unfairness, it ensures that 
access to discretion is not prohibitive. Rather, it allows those who submit that the general 
rule does not result in a fair outcome to have their case decided in a similar way to the 
status quo: judicial discretion. This maintains the core balance between a system blending 
rules and discretion—a crucial aspect of an effective law. This was demonstrated in both 
Chapter One, where it was argued that such a balance is theoretically necessary to avoid 
adverse consequences,506 and Chapter Two, which confirmed the need for a rule-
discretion balance in the specific area of financial remedies law.507 Moreover, the 
preservation of the Section 25 factors when determining the matter of unfairness for the 
purposes of the threshold serves an additional motive. It ensures that while this proposal 
represents a significant change, it is far from radical. This is important when considering 
                                                          
504 Most prominently of which are Lord Nicholl’s and Baroness Hale’s from Miller; McFarlane (n 7). 
505 Which, for the sake of clarity, are based on the current Section 25 factors. 
506 Hawkins (n 42) 11. 
507 Davis (n 300) 44. 
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whether this reform proposal would be well received by the legal community; whether it 
is palatable. Indeed, the most challenging aspect of a proposal gaining approval is 
reaching a balance of rules and discretion with which a majority can agree. Even if the 
balanced position on the spectrum which this thesis has argued to be ideal is accepted in 
theoretical or logical terms, the emotive aspect of politics may be influential in policy-
making—particularly in this area. If this proposal were to be submitted in the form of a 
Bill put before Parliament, the strength of the legal arguments (both practical and 
theoretical) would be weakened by political pressures which may distort it. As the Law 
Commission noted in its 2014 report on Matrimonial Property, Needs and Agreements, 
one of the major barriers to the development of a formulaic approach to the calculation of 
needs in matrimonial finance ‘is the memory of the original version of the Child Support 
Act 1991, whose calculation required some one hundred items of information and 
produced some notoriously inappropriate results.’508 In Schedule 1 of that statute, 
maintenance assessments were calculated in accordance with various formulae, which 
would create mathematical equations to reach the appropriate child support 
maintenance.509 Unsurprisingly, this approach was overly complicated for many parents 
to apply to their personal lives.510 Given the ‘chaos’ the formula of the 1991 Act produced, 
the Law Commission concluded that this ‘experience, and a great respect for judicial 
discretion, combine to make formulae something of an anathema for English family 
lawyers.’511 Yet, while this critique opposes overly rigid formulaic reform—and perhaps 
                                                          
508 Law Commission (n 30) [3.129]. 
509 Child Support Act 1991, sch 1.1(1-5). 
510 For an important critique of the Act, see Alison Garnham and Emma Knights, Putting the Treasury 
First: The Truth about Child Support (Child Poverty Action Group 1994). 
511 Law Commission (n 30) [3.129]. 
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even suggestions to impose financial provision bands512— this example of past experience 
does not appear to run counter to the position of this paper that reform should be balanced 
between rules and discretion. Rather, it is submitted that this thesis’ proposal, through its 
threshold of ‘unfairness’, reaches a compromise between changing the legal framework 
in order to enhance the degree of certainty and appreciating the trepidation towards the 
imposition of rules—particularly when viewed in the context of the legal and political 
history of England and Wales in respect of family law. Accordingly, it is imperative that 
the threshold is important yet also accessible.513 
iii) The discretion component 
The third and final element of the fail-safe model is the exercise of judicial discretion to 
reach a decision on a particular issue in matrimonial proceedings. The stage would almost 
entirely resemble the way in which financial remedies cases are currently handled under 
the MCA 1973: judicial discretion exercised through a holistic evaluation of the facts of 
a specific case in order to obtain a fair outcome.514 More specifically, while a judge would 
be constrained by the relevant legal rules and precedent, they would have the flexibility 
currently enjoyed by family judges to consider the case on its facts and reach a fair 
outcome for both parties to the marriage. Accordingly, while the fail-safe model would 
add two new components to financial remedies law (the rule and the threshold), it would 
preserve the status quo for cases that overcome the threshold and require a more 
individualised, fact-sensitive determination. It may be contended that by retaining the 
discretionary component, this proposal fails to deliver any substantial change. However, 
                                                          
512 Andrew McFarlane (n 22). 
513 For both the judiciary and for individuals using the law. 
514 For a more in-depth coverage of the current law, refer back to Chapter Three. 
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in Chapter Two, it was concluded that the ideal position—as asserted by this thesis—on 
the rule-discretion spectrum for financial remedies law is a middle position, with a slight 
preference for discretion. Accordingly, in attempting to align the reform proposal to this 
finding, it would be inaccurate and flawed to present a model which completely—or 
indeed even significantly—abandons the centrality of judicial discretion to this particular 
area of law. Consequently, in following the conclusion in Chapter One that a balance 
between rules and discretion is theoretically important to avoid a deficient legal system, 
and the conclusion in Chapter Two that the ideal position on the spectrum is a marginal 
preference for discretion, it is appropriate for the fail-safe model to preserve the role of 
judicial discretion. In essence, this approach to reform, it is argued, represents a 
reasonable yet comprehensive change to the law which would be likely to appeal to a wide 
range of individuals across the family law community.515 Lastly, to strengthen the case 
for this particular proposal, it is worth exploring both the advantages and potential 
disadvantages that this model would provide the family justice system and ultimately why 
it is concluded that it presents a compelling model for future reform. 
 
 
                                                          
515 See the Law Commission’s conclusions regarding the views of practitioners towards reform: ‘…a 
child-support-style formula that gave a single answer in a given case would not be acceptable to us or to 
the family law profession…However, there remains potential for development of guidelines similar to the 
Canadian SSAG. These are not wholly opposed by our legal practitioner consultees. We agree, of course, 
that a world where everyone had access to legal advice and to judicial discretion that provided “a bespoke 
approach in each case so as to achieve fairness” would be ideal. But that is not available. In the light of 
that, we have recommended a transparent objective for spousal support as described above, and guidelines 
showing the way in which that objective is to be achieved. In addition, it may be helpful to people to have 
access to a calculation that could be made available online, as is the child support formula, and that would 
indicate at least a “ball-park” – a range within which people could then negotiate.’ Law Commission (n 
30) [3.151-3.152]. 
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iv) Is the proposal more desirable than the status quo? 
In analysing the benefits that the balanced approach of this proposal would provide, it is 
necessary to revisit the core issues that were raised in Chapter Two when determining the 
ideal balance between rules and discretion, and comparing the predicted impacts this 
proposal would have on those matters to the current state of the law as assessed in Chapter 
Three. The three main headings of those matters are efficiency, procedural fairness, and 
individualised justice. With respect to efficiency, it was concluded in Chapter Two that 
on a purely theoretical level, the arguments in favour of either rules or discretion were 
evenly balanced—thereby not providing any real justification for why this proposal would 
be more desirable than the status quo. However, it was reasoned that when taking into 
account other crucial factors to the calculus, such as the potential imbalance of bargaining 
power between parties (often along gender lines) and the harmful effects that legal aid 
cuts have had on access to justice, certainty should be slightly prioritised over flexibility. 
Increased certainty would not only create a culture of entitlement to equality of 
matrimonial property (which could be departed from in either direction if equality would 
be unfair), it would also assist the economically weaker party, which often turns out to be 
a woman.516 The primary issue with the current law is that, where there is an overly 
uncertain law, this increases the advantage that economically stronger parties may 
exercise throughout the process—particularly in private negotiations.517 Without clear 
guidelines, a more vulnerable party may not have a reliable benchmark to assess their 
entitlements, and with the threat of court expenses and the emotional labour of enduring 
                                                          
516 Wilkinson-Ryan and Small (n 302) 120; Thompson (n 303) 189. 
517 As discussed in Chapter Two: Mnookin and Kornhauser (n 281) 979-980. 
132 
 
such proceedings, they may be treated unfairly.518 Still, under the current status quo, even 
those who receive legal advice may not be given a clear indication by practitioners of the 
outcome of their case.519 It is, therefore, unsurprising that the complex and opaque legal 
framework has contributed to the inefficiency—in terms of both time and costs—of a case 
involving a litigant in person.520 With this proposal, it is expected that the enhanced 
structure of the law will assist litigants in person and vulnerable parties to understand the 
basic principles of the law and reach a fair settlement more efficiently.521 With reference 
to the Scottish law, the equating of ‘fair’ as ‘equal sharing of matrimonial property’ has 
been seen to allow for much more cost-effective approaches to litigation. As a solicitor 
from a survey opined, this ‘pragmatic approach leads people to think it can make more 
sense to: “bail out and get on with your life”.’522 Under the fail-safe model, while the rule 
may be departed from, it at least provides a starting point and structures the discussion 
that these individuals may have either in or out of court. 
In terms of procedural fairness, it was highlighted in Chapter Two that rules ought to be 
marginally prioritised in order to further this objective. In particular, it was demonstrated 
that legal consistency is an issue which is especially problematic in legal systems with 
                                                          
518 Hitchings and Miles (n 368) 47: ‘But with the withdrawal of legal aid, the personal shopper is no 
longer available to most financial remedy customers. Discretion – even if corralled by judicial principle, 
consistently applied to those cases that reach court, by consent or otherwise – is a difficult juristic tool for 
parties without legal advice and assistance to deploy in private ordering.’ 
519 Douglas (n 438) 76. 
520 Cox (n 23). 
521 Judges already have a number of duties to litigants in person to ensure that they understand the 
important matters. Given that this duty involves providing clear explanations on the relevant issues, the 
fact that this proposal clarifies the position of the law would certainly serve to facilitate this process for 
the judge(s). For more details on the duties owed by the court to litigants in person, see the ‘Litigants in 
Person and Lay Representatives’ chapter of Judicial College, ‘Equal Treatment Bench Book’ (February 
2018) 1.1-1.31 <https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/equal-treatment-bench-book-
february2018-v5-02mar18.pdf> accessed 11 July 2019. 
522 Mair, Mordaunt and Wasoff (n 497) 59. 
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highly discretionary legal frameworks. In England and Wales, the Law Commission has 
evidenced the prevalence of forum shopping in different parts of the country—a strategy 
aimed at receiving a more favourable outcome based on the tendencies of certain regional 
courts to decide cases in a distinctive way.523 This has significant effects on the rule of 
law and the legal consistency present within financial remedies law, and is therefore an 
important issue which must be addressed.524 As a prominent family finance barrister 
noted, the current dependency on judicial discretion means results are ‘unpredictable and 
what our clients are looking for is a principled approach such that the outcome of litigation 
is not a gamble.’525 Under the fail-safe model, it must be conceded that forum shopping 
would not be completely eradicated as it is linked to the individualised application of the 
law by specific judges, and naturally neither would the possibility of inconsistency in the 
application of the law. Such inconsistency is inherent with a model which allows for 
judicial discretion, and a limited degree of legal inconsistency is not only inevitable, it is 
not necessarily particularly harmful.526 Perfection is not the aim: improvement is. It is 
submitted that the fail-safe model does just that. It improves the state of legal consistency 
by providing a balanced framework. This balance is important in two senses. Firstly, the 
structure of the initial ‘rule’ aspect of the model ensures that judges are more likely to 
reach similar outcomes for similar cases.527 This is because the weight and scope for 
                                                          
523 Law Commission (n 30) [2.53]. 
524 ibid [2.53]. 
525 Ann Hussey QC, ‘Spousal Maintenance: Principles or Chaos? The Need for Reform and the Deech 
Bill’ (Middle Temple Amity Visit to Hong Kong, 2015) 28 
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%20Kong> accessed 17 May 2019. 
526 David Strauss, ‘Must Like Cases be Treated Alike?’ (2002) University of Chicago Public Law & Legal 
Theory Working Paper 24 
<https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1197&context
=public_law_and_legal_theory> accessed 7 April 2019. 
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individual bias and opinion is limited to cases where the threshold is satisfied. While the 
threshold is not high enough to completely eliminate the potential for the judge’s personal 
interpretation, this actually leads to the second reason why the balanced approach 
enhances legal consistency. By including a fail-safe through the path to discretion, the 
model is able to avoid the Harris ‘arbitrariness attack’—that overly rigid rules would 
result in practically identical cases being treated differently because of ‘an insignificant 
difference between the cases.’528 Accordingly, this thesis’ proposal is able to factor the 
arguments on both ends of the rules-discretion spectrum in harmony and reflect what is 
argued to be the ideal position of financial remedies law. For these reasons, it is contended 
that the fail-safe model would represent a significant improvement from the status quo 
through providing greater legal consistency. 
Lastly, the effects that the proposal would have on individualised justice should be 
considered. It is intuitive that a legal system which is intentionally flexible to allow a 
judge to evaluate the facts of each case in order to reach the fairest result would be 
proficient in meeting the objective of individualised justice. As was mentioned in Chapter 
Three, the limited scope of this thesis is such that it has not gathered and assessed all of 
the ‘everyday’ cases in an attempt to determine whether the law in England and Wales is 
generally substantively fair. Accordingly, it was concluded that this thesis will assume 
that the English and Welsh regime, which prides itself on its flexible nature designed to 
achieve fair results, is effective in realising individualised justice.529 Therefore, while the 
case for this proposal in relation to individualised justice is not to contend that it 
                                                          
528 Harris (n 290) 1100. 
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necessarily improves this quality of the law, this thesis does submit that it certainly would 
not worsen the state of substantive fairness. In support of this, it is worth turning to the 
Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985. This statute, which can be described as being 
‘positioned at a relatively midway point on the rules-versus-discretion continuum,’530 
would appear to be attaining the requisite standard of individualised justice—not least 
because it has been a remarkably successful and durable piece of legislation.531 In fact, it 
has been argued that while the Scottish law promotes certainty to a greater extent than 
England and Wales, this has not come ‘at the expense of fairness, which remains within 
reach, whatever the circumstances before the court.’532 Similarly, the fail-safe proposal 
would not interfere with the attainment of individualised justice. Given the relatively low 
threshold in the general provision (whether following the relevant rule would result in 
unfairness), the access to judicial discretion is readily available for those cases which 
would benefit from it. Therefore, while the state of individualised justice would not 
necessarily improve from the status quo, it is not expected that it would deteriorate.533 
Ultimately, this thesis does not submit that this proposal would solve every issue perfectly. 
It is contended, however, that many of the issues currently experienced in financial 
remedies law would be ameliorated by a framework which reflects a more balanced 
approach to the application of rules and discretion. The fail-safe model, it is argued, most 
effectively serves this purpose. Accordingly, this thesis submits that the fail-safe model 
                                                          
530 Crowley (n 162) 392. 
531 Mair, Mordaunt and Wasoff (n 497); Lady Wise, ‘The Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985: A Financial 
Provision Regime Built to Last’ (University of Edinburgh, 2016) 1 
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533 Again, it is worth acknowledging that, given the lack of information on the current state of 
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would provide a number of improvements to the financial remedies law, and as such it is 
clearly more desirable than continuing with the status quo. 
 
d) Case examples 
Finally, as the last part of the discussion of the fail-safe proposal, this section will 
demonstrate how it would be applied to a financial remedies case, and whether the results 
would differ from those under the current legal framework. This section will explore two 
different types of cases: one reported, well-known big money case, and the other being a 
hypothetical everyday case. The reason for this approach is twofold. Firstly, given the 
vastly different principles and procedures applied between big money and everyday cases, 
it is important to illustrate how this proposal would impact each separately. Secondly, 
while analysing the past case will involve comparing the predicted result under this 
proposal to the actual decision of the court, the hypothetical case exercise will involve a 
slightly different approach of predicting both the outcome under the status quo and the 
proposal. Accordingly, the range of insights that can be drawn from these two different 
case studies should contribute to a greater understanding of the true impacts of this 
proposal. 
i) Past case: Miller v Miller [2006] 2 AC 618 
In the Miller case, Mr and Mrs Miller married in July 2000, and nearly three years later 
separated in April 2003. At the time of separation, the husband was aged 39 and the wife 
was 33 years of age. They did not have any children. During the marriage, the wife was 
earning an annual income of £85,000 working as an associate partner at a financial public 
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relations firm. The husband was a fund manager who had accumulated a significant 
amount of wealth prior to the marriage, and had made plans ahead of the marriage to move 
to a different company (New Star). Soon after the marriage, the husband made the move 
to New Star, which grew quickly as a result of efforts made largely during the marriage. 
Upon divorce, the wife claimed ancillary relief and was awarded the matrimonial home 
as well as £2.7m—amounting to a total award of £5m. The Court of Appeal upheld this 
decision, and the husband appealed to the House of Lords. While the issue of how much 
weight ought to be attributed to conduct was contested, the House of Lords nonetheless 
dismissed the appeal on the basis that while he had brought into the marriage a 
considerable amount of wealth, he had also grown his net worth significantly during the 
marriage. The average between expert valuations was that his shares in New Star had 
grown to £15m over the course of the short marriage, which, naturally, would be 
considered matrimonial property.534 Ultimately, it was estimated that the husband was 
worth £32m, which meant that the award of £5m represented less than one-sixth of the 
total assets, and less than one-third of the matrimonial assets. This amount, it was 
reasoned, ‘reflects the amount of work done by the husband on this business project before 
the marriage.’535 Accordingly, the House of Lords concluded that £5m was a fair award 
to the wife in what was a ‘highly unusual case.’536 
It is the position of this thesis that under the fail-safe proposal, the outcome would likely 
have been the same or very similar to that reached by the House of Lords in 2006. Miller 
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was uncommon not only because it was a big money case,537 but also due to the brief 
duration of the marriage and the remarkable expansion of the husband’s wealth during 
that short period of time.538 Accordingly, the rule portion of the fail-safe model would 
have been unfit for this case, and as such the husband would have disputed this aspect of 
the law (for example, an equal division of matrimonial property). Given the unique set of 
facts in this case, the threshold would have been engaged and satisfied with ease. With 
reference to the section 2(3) factors under this proposal, both the short duration of the 
marriage and the disproportionately larger financial contribution by the husband would 
indicate equal division would be unfair. Ultimately, this would result in the case being 
decided according to judicial discretion which would be applying the same set of 
principles that were relevant in the House of Lords decision. What this example shows is 
that this thesis’ proposal is unlikely to have a profound impact on the unusual outlier cases 
which find their way to the higher courts. However, it is submitted that this is an 
inherent—and attractive—part of the model. Under this proposal, where a case raises an 
issue(s) which sets it apart from the ‘average’ or ‘standard’ financial remedies case, it will 
most likely satisfy the threshold criteria of ‘unfairness’. As a result, this would enable the 
court to depart from the constraints of the rule and seek a fair outcome through the exercise 
of judicial discretion. While it may be argued that this would dilute the effectiveness of 
the original rule, it should be considered that, as discussed above, a balance between the 
                                                          
537 Admittedly, these high-value asset cases make up most of the reported cases. However, in the context 
of the majority of cases heard across the country on any given day, cases such as Miller–which see tens of 
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538 Anne Barlow, ‘Community of Property – the logical response to Miller and McFarlane?’ (2007) 39 
Bracton Law Journal 19, 24. 
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rule and discretion is necessary.539 Accordingly, where a particular case presents a unique 
factual matrix, uniformly applying a rule which would demonstrably lead to unfairness 
tilts the scales too far in favour of rules and certainty. Rather, it is precisely in these 
scenarios—where the outlier case does not fit within the broader mould of the rule—
where judicial discretion is necessary to uphold the objective of individualised justice. 
The impact that this proposal could have on the everyday case, however, may be quite 
different. 
ii) Hypothetical ‘everyday’ case: Kiran v Kiran [2019] 
Surya and Eliana Kiran had been married for 25 years when they decided to separate. At 
the time of separation, the husband was aged 49 and the wife was 48. They had two 
children who are now fully grown and financially independent. The husband works as a 
project manager at a media company, earning £32,000 per annum. The wife stayed at 
home to look after the children as they were growing up, but she has since worked part-
time as a learning assistant, which provides an annual income of £14,000. The 
matrimonial home is valued at £250,000 and is mortgage-free. Surya and Eliana also have 
combined savings of £260,000. 
Under the fail-safe proposal, the rule would be that matrimonial property is to be divided 
equally. In this case, the total value of the matrimonial assets amounts to £510,000. 
Accordingly, in the event that the home were to be sold, each party would receive 
£255,000 out of the matrimonial property pot as part of the settlement for divorce. 
                                                          
539 As discussed above, this balance is not only imperative according to the theoretical arguments 
advanced in Chapter One, it is also necessary in order to create important yet realistic (i.e. palatable) 
change. 
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Importantly, in a case such as this where there exists no significant complicating factors, 
a submission by either party that this outcome would be unfair in an attempt to trigger the 
threshold criteria would be unlikely to succeed. While the husband is currently earning 
more than the wife, there is no reason why the wife should not be able to sustain herself. 
She has transitioned from caring for the children to entering the workforce, and has been 
earning a decent income for several years. Accordingly, she is in a position to increase 
her hours or move within her industry in order to boost her annual income. Furthermore, 
bearing in mind the fact that the children are no longer a financial consideration, the 
settlement award will allow her to secure a house and retain additional savings for the 
future. For these reasons, the threshold criteria would not be satisfied in this case and the 
rule of equal sharing of matrimonial property would apply. While this might appear to be 
restrictive, it provides a number of benefits to both parties. Not only does the fail-safe 
proposal provide an easy-to-use system for the division of assets—and therefore reduce 
the parties’ legal costs—it would also incidentally increase the efficiency of the resolution 
of these cases. If the rule was respected and a precedent were to be set, it is likely that 
neither Surya nor Eliana would dispute the applicability of the rule, because their case is 
so close to what the rule intended to govern that the difference in outcome if litigated is 
not greater than the exorbitant costs of matrimonial proceedings. Admittedly, the fail-safe 
model is not perfect. It may, and likely will inevitably, be that the rule aspect of the model 
will not lead to a perfectly just result for one or both parties in a given case. Yet, not only 
is such perfect justice an unrealistic goal, it is also a narrow view of justice. As has been 
stressed throughout this thesis, and in particular in Chapter Two, fairness and justice must 
be understood in a broad sense—substantively and procedurally. A balance must be 
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struck, and thus the pursuit of individualised justice is not an absolute one, but rather a 
matter of degree. To draw a parallel to a different context, it is worth considering the 
perspective of Lord Sumption on the issue of eliminating risk. Through the example of 
road accidents, he said the following: 
‘They are by far the largest source of accidental physical injury in this country. 
We could almost completely eliminate them by reviving the Locomotive Act 
1865, which limited the speed of motorised vehicles to 4mph in the country and 
2mph in towns. Today, we allow faster speeds than that, although we know for 
certain that it will mean many more people being killed or injured. And we do this, 
because total safety would be too inconvenient. Difficult as it is to say so, hundreds 
of deaths on the roads and thousands of crippling injuries are thought to be a price 
worth paying for the ability to get around quicker and more comfortably. So 
eliminating risk is not an absolute value, it’s a question of degree.’540 
Similarly, while this proposal may be criticised for limiting the extent of judicial 
discretion afforded to the courts and restricting the flexibility of the MCA, such a measure 
is justified in order to shift the position of the law to a more balanced application of rules 
and discretion. While this proposal incorporates a more broad-brush approach to financial 
remedies cases than the status quo (insofar as the general rule operates as the starting 
point), it would appear to be capable of achieving results which are holistically fair.541 
While reaching a fair outcome is crucial in financial remedies cases, it is also important 
for the parties to resolve their legal disputes in an efficient and cost effective manner. 
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Accordingly, it is argued that this balance between rules and discretion is needed in the 
modern financial remedies law.542 The fail-safe model, through its three components (rule, 
threshold, and discretion), attempts to reflect a near-middle position on the rules-
discretion spectrum; effectively weighing and balancing the competing objectives of the 
law. For this reason, it is submitted that the fail-safe model presents a compelling proposal 
for reform. 
 
Conclusions 
This Chapter has focused on introducing this thesis’ proposal for reform: the fail-safe 
model. It has approached this by delineating the core elements of the model, explaining 
the model in the context of financial remedies law, justifying each aspect as well as the 
proposal as a whole, and demonstrating how the proposal would be applied in practice. 
This Chapter has also identified the current reform proposal being considered by 
Parliament, and has argued why adopting the Deech Bill would be undesirable for a 
number of reasons. Given the arguments advanced in Chapter Two, the evidence of the 
shortcomings of the law in England and Wales in Chapter Three, and the growing 
movement in favour of reform, it would appear that changes to the law are inevitable. The 
question, therefore, is how the law is to progress from its current state. Ultimately, it has 
been argued that a reform proposal should embody a balance between rules and discretion. 
This is for two main reasons. Firstly, Chapter Two concluded a near-middle position 
(marginally favouring discretion) would enable the law to attain its core objectives, which 
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means an effective proposal would attempt to align with this theoretical position. 
Secondly, reaching a compromise between rules and discretion is useful for the practical 
success of a model for reform. While a proposal should create meaningful change, a 
radical shift in the law would decrease its likelihood of amassing widespread support—
especially in the area of financial remedies law. It is the position of this thesis that the fail-
safe model, as presented and justified in this Chapter, effectively reaches this balance 
between rules and discretion. For this reason, the fail-safe model presents a cogent 
approach for future reform. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis has focused on the extent of judicial discretion provided by the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1973. In particular, it has examined the relationship between rules and 
discretion, and sought to discern the appropriate balance for the specific law relating to 
financial remedy orders. This analysis is important, because the shortcomings of the 
current law and the topical nature of the subject make it an issue which is both relevant 
and pressing. Having identified this problem, this thesis sought to provide a unique 
contribution by attempting to reformulate the MCA through a theoretical approach.543 
In addressing the research questions raised at the beginning of this thesis, it was first 
argued that any law needs to draw a balance between rules and discretion, for a system 
predicated on an extreme version of either would result in undesirable consequences. 
Chapter One continued by pursuing the question of how to determine the appropriate 
balance for a specific law. It was contended that this query is best approached by first 
ascertaining the overarching purpose of the relevant law, which then makes it possible to 
deduce which mixture of rules and discretion would most effectively promote the 
achievement of that law’s fundamental objective. Accordingly, in Chapter Two, this thesis 
attempted to search for the purpose of financial remedies law, and concluded that it is to 
reach a substantively and procedurally fair outcome in each case. Based on this analysis, 
it was argued that the appropriate balance between rules and discretion for financial 
remedies would be a position near the middle of the spectrum, with a slight preference for 
discretion. In Chapter Three, the statutory framework and judicially developed principles 
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were evaluated to discern the extent of discretion present in the current law. It was found 
that the law in England and Wales does not align with the theoretically determined ideal 
position, nor is it effective in attaining a number of important policy objectives, which led 
to the conclusion that statutory reform is necessary. The fourth and final Chapter assessed 
the topical Deech Bill which is currently being reviewed by Parliament, and judged it to 
be an undesirable path for reform. Accordingly, this thesis proposed a model for reform: 
the fail-safe model. In summary, this model attempted to embody the appropriate position 
on the rule-discretion spectrum by creating a legal framework which offers a rule that can 
be departed from where a threshold is satisfied, resulting in the case being decided 
according to judicial discretion.544 
Ultimately, this thesis submits that the solution to the rule-discretion debate in financial 
remedies law is to reach a near even balance in the weight given to each consideration. 
Admittedly, financial remedies (and perhaps family law as a whole) is a difficult area to 
reform, as it raises countless issues and considerations which are often fiercely debated.545 
No law can be absolutely perfect, and as such, this thesis does not attempt to claim that it 
provides the perfect solution. However, through this nearly equally mixed structure, it is 
argued that the overriding purpose of the law—fairness—can be more wholly attained, in 
terms of both its substantive and procedural elements. Moreover, beyond aligning with 
the theoretical conclusions of this research, it is contended that this approach would more 
likely be received positively by a wide range of legal practitioners and academics, as it 
reflects a balanced perspective and seeks compromise. 
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The case for this thesis’ reform proposal is increasingly compelling in light of the recent 
legal and political developments. Baroness Deech has proposed a widely criticised Bill 
for reform,546 which has passed through the House of Lords and is due for its second 
reading in the House of Commons.547 Sir Andrew McFarlane has outlined various 
proposals to ameliorate the state of the law.548 Sir James Munby, during his tenure as 
President of the Family Division, worked to refine the ‘application of procedural justice’ 
for financial remedies law.549 Moreover, when this is considered in conjunction with the 
impact of legal aid cuts on the preponderance of litigants in person in private family law 
cases, it is evident that there is a growing appetite for change and improvement in this 
area of law. By setting the scales to appropriately balance certainty and individualised 
justice, legal consistency and flexibility, and, ultimately, rules and discretion, this thesis 
contends that the fail-safe model is the way forward. 
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